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THE ANNUAL JOHN RANDOLPH TUCKER LECTURE
TAKING NEEDS SERIOUSLY: OBSERVATIONS ON THE
NECESSITY FOR CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE*
ARTui S. MILLER**
Justice is the end of government. It is the end of civil society. It has
ever been and ever will be pursued until it is obtained, or until liberty
is lost in the pursuit.
-James Madison'
The government of the United States-however well it may have served
in the past century and a half, and however sound it may still be in
its fundamental structure and functions-is nevertheless in conspicuous
need of an exhaustive rehabilitation.
-Clinton Rossiter2
I. INTRODUCTION: Ti PROBLEM POSED
Several years ago Professor Ronald Dworkin published an important book
entitled Taking Rights Seriously.3 The main title of this lecture is, of course,
either a variation on or an extension of Dworkin's message. I shall suggest
and give reasons for the proposition that the time has come for constitutionalists
to take human needs seriously. I have little dispute with what Dworkin has
to say: to me, it is, or at least it should be, beyond argument that "our con-
stitutional system rests on a particular moral theory, namely, that men have
moral rights against the state." ' 4 What those rights should be is the essence
* This is an extension of remarks made at the 36th annual John Randolph Tucker Lec-
ture, October 12, 1984, and is based upon the author's work in progress-a book on constitu-
tional change.
** Professor Emeritus of Law, George Washington University; A.B., Willamette Univer-
sity (1938); LL.B., Stanford University (1949); J.S.D., Yale University (1959); LL.D. (Hon.),
Nova University (1984).
1. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (J. Madison).
2. C. RossITER, CONSTrrUTIONAL DICTATORsHIP 307 (1948).
3. R. DWORxNt, TAKING RIGHTs SERIOUSLY (1978).
4. Id. at 147.
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of what follows. Unless the term is defined to include the dimension of human
needs-something that Professor Dworkin does not do-it is seriously faulty.
One can, to be sure, easily mesh needs into a concept of rights; and to some
extent that will be done. Rights, however, frequently are defined otherwise,
often in a "conservative" sense of "vested rights."
In main thrust, I will propose that the Constitution should be altered to
reflect that government has certain obligations to the populace. Those obliga-
tions or duties look to what governments must or should do, in a positive
or affirmative manner, rather than, as the orthodox view of constitutionalism
would have it, what governments cannot do.' In Leon Duguit's words, "Any
system of public law can be vital only so far as it is based on a given sanction
to the following rules: First, the holders of power cannot do certain things;
second, there are certain things they must do." 6 We are not accustomed to
thinking about the "must do" aspect of governance; Cooley's Constitutional
Limitations is still the basic text for most constitutional commentary. The Bill
of Rights, for example, speaks in terms of negative naysaying; it is a series
of "thou shalt nots" aimed at the national and, in recent years, the state govern-
ments. In some respects, it can be read as an affirmative command, but at
best in a half-hearted manner. The changes in our fundamental law I shall
recommend can come about in several ways: by a series of amendments (a
sort of continuing constitutional convention that Congress submits to the
states); by congressional action that is given judicial approval; or by another
constitutional convention. I will favor the third alternative. What Congress
gives, it can take away-and I think it necessary to embed certain matters
into the Constitution and keep them beyond the reach of transcient majorities
in Congress. And a series of amendments would involve a long, drawn-out
process sure to be abrasive and divisive. All of this will become clearer in
the discussion below. My basic point is that substantial structural change in
the Constitution can best come by a convention. In saying that, I am of course
fully cognizant of the arguments against a convention; but choose to reject
them, for reasons later delineated.
The task of dealing with constitutional change is not lightly undertaken.
Recall, in this connection, Alexander Hamilton's language in Federalist No.
5. See, e.g., F. HAYEK, TB CONSTITUTION OF LiBERTY 181 (1960).
Constitutionalism means that all power rests on the understanding that it will be exer-
cised according to commonly accepted principles, that the persons on whom power
is conferred are selected because it is thought that they are most likely to do what
is right, not in order that whatever they do should be right. It rests, in the last resort,
on the understanding that power is ultimately not a physical fact but a state of opinion
which makes people obey.
C. McILWIN, CONSITrUTIONALISM: ANcmNT AND MODERN 21 (rev. ed. 1947) ("Constitutionalism
has one essential quality: it is a legal limitation on government."). See also Friedrich, Constitu-
tions and Constitutionalism, 3 INT'L ENCY. Soc. Sci. 318, 319, 325 (D. Sills ed. 1968); Murphy,
An Ordering of Constitutional Values, 53 S. CAL. L. Rav. 703, 758 (1980) ("The fundamental
value that constitutionalism protects is human dignity.").
6. L. Duourr, LAw IN THE MODERN STATE 26 (H. Laski trans. 1919).
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1: He asked "whether societies . . . are really capable . . . of establishing
good government from reflection and choice, or whether they are forever
destined to depend for their political constitutions on accident and force."
Hamilton was arguing for ratification of the Constitution of 1787. Americans
have been extremely fortunate: The government established by the Document
of 1787 set us on our way; but in many respects what we have become has
largely been a consequent of "accident and force." It is a sobering thought
to reflect that the Framers did their difficult job and the United States has
waxed strong and prosperous, so that today it is one of the superpowers of
the world, but this condition was produced less because of the few thousand
words drafted in 1787 than in spite of them.' Only by ignoring, when deemed
necessary, what appear to be the plain commands of the Constitution was
the nation able to become what it is today. I will not list all of those decisions;
it is sufficient to mention the Louisiana Purchase, the Mexican-American War,
President Lincoln's actions at the beginning of the Civil War, and the Supreme
Court's protection throughout our history of what Professor Felix Frankfurter
called "finance capital." 8 None of those was ordained by the Constitution
and each is, at least theoretically, contrary to the original spirit and intent.
No need exists, however, to be overly legalistic. Surely, factors exogenous
to the Constitution were more important than the provisions of the numinous
document of 1787. Rufus E. Miles, Jr. said it well: "The extraordinary
affluence of the United States has been produced by a set of fortuitous,
nonreplicable, and nonsustainable factors. ' 9 Among those are the obvious
ones of an untapped continental-sized nation with fabulous natural resources,
protected for many decades by two oceans and the British navy, and a political
system not characterized by the shortcomings of pluralism now so evident in
the arena of politics. To state the point somewhat differently: the Constitu-
tion has always been relative to circumstances. Without exception, govern-
ment thus far has been as strong as conditions required.'I Even in the heyday
of the so-called negative, nightwatchman state of laissez-faire economics read
into public policy by the Supreme Court, Americans have been able to wage
7. Cf. Miller, The End of a 400-Year Boom, 24 TECHNOLOGICAL FORECASTING & SOC.
CHANGE 255 (1983).
8. Frankfurter, Justice Holmes Defines the Constitution, in LAW AND POLITcs 61 (A.
MacLeish & H. Prichard eds. 1939).
9. R. MILEs, Aw~AKNiNG FROM THE AMRUCAN DPEAm: THE SOcIAL AND PoLrcAL LIMITS
To GROWTH 224 (1976). See W. Opmros, ECOLOGY AND THE PoLrrIcS OF ScAcr-Y: PROLOGUE
TO A PoLrrcA THEORY OF THE STADY STATE (1977).
10. See F. NEumANN, THE DEmocRATic AND THE AuTHoRrrAmAN STATE 8 (1957).
No society in recorded history has ever been able to dispense with political power.
This is as true of liberalism as of absolutism, as true of laissez faire as of an interven-
tionist state. No greater disservice has been rendered to political science than the state-
ment that the liberal state was a "weak" state. It was precisely as strong as it needed
to be in the circumstances. It acquired substantial colonial empires, waged wars, held
down internal disorders, and stabilized itself over long periods of time.
See also Miller, Reason of State and the Emergent Constitution of Control, 64 MINN. L. REv.
585 (1980).
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wars (many instances of violence were without congressional approval), obtain
colonial empires, and suppress internal dissent. The question Americans must
face today is whether a novel set of circumstances requires rethinking the basic
premises of the ancient Document. I so believe, and will attempt to demonstrate
why such a conclusion is valid, even necessary. Stated more bluntly, either
the Constitution is rewritten to reflect modern exigencies or what we now have
should be recognized as a mere piece of paper, important principally as the
chief artifact of America's civil religion. No middle ground exists.
What follows is in many respects an exercise in utopian thought. There
is value in such an inquiry. Ideas have consequences, as John Maynard Keynes
in a famous passage once asserted." And we all know the cliche that there
is nothing quite so powerful as an idea whose time has come. (The caveat
to that, of course, is that there is nothing quite so impotent as an idea whose
time has not come.) The idea of constitutional revision is already being discussed
by a number of people; it will increasingly be the focus of attention, in one
form or another, as the nation approaches the 200th anniversary of its only
constitutional convention. Utopias are proposals for ideal communities; they
have been known since at least Plato's time. Utopian thought is an effort
to justify the reasons why such communities are held to be ideal. Professor
William A. Galston has explained:
Utopian thought performs three related functions. First, it guides
our deliberation, whether in devising courses of action or in choosing
among exogenously defined alternatives with which we are confronted.
Second, it justifies our actions; the grounds of action are reasons that
others ought to accept and-given openness and the freedom to
reflect-can be led to accept. Third, it serves as the basis for the evalua-
tion of existing institutions and practices.'2
Proposing a constitution of human needs will, I hope, help to guide, at least
partially, the content in the growing debate about the viability of the Con-
stitution of 1787, develop reasons why others ought to accept major revisions,
and help evaluate our present politico-economic institutions. It is well to
remember that the men of 1787, they who are now revered as the Founding
Fathers, were themselves engaging in utopian thought when they exceeded their
mission of merely revising the Articles of Confederation and produced the
Constitution.
11. J. KEYNES, TIE GENERAL THoRY oF EmpLoxaymNT, INTEREST, AND MONEY, 383-84 (1936).
The ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and when
they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed the world
is ruled by little else. Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from
any intellectual influences, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist .... I
am sure that the power of vested interests is vastly exaggerated compared with the
gradual encroachment of ideas.
12. W. GALSTON, JUSTICE AND Tm HuMAN GOOD 14 (1980).
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In this intellectual journey that we, as students of American constitu-
tionalism, are undertaking, I would like at the outset to bury, so far as possible,
the idea that there is something wrong about having an "ideology." An
ideology, Clifford Geertz tells us, provides "a symbolic framework in terms
of which to formulate, think about, and react to political problems. ' ' For
some reason, we have become accustomed to the notion that there is something
essentially good about being pragmatic and something bad about being
ideological. To be a "hard-nosed pragmatist" is about the highest accolade
one can receive if he works in Washington. The notion is fallacious, even
dangerous. Pragmatism, whatever the term means (many definitions exist),
is a poor substitute for a set of political values and beliefs-an ideology, if
you will.I4 Whether realized or not, everyone has an ideology; indeed, everyone
should have one, openly acknowledged as such. There is no more dangerous
person than the ideologue who insists that he has no ideology. It is far better
for anyone-in present context, a constitutional commentator-to "face his
valuations," as Gunnar Myrdal counsels," than to proceed on the assump-
tion, as apparently most legal scholars do, that there is any such thing as
unbiased knowing. (My valuations are readily perceivable from what is said
in this lecture.) We should as legal scholars remember that "the ideal model
of an empty mind passively contemplating pure data presented to pure
awareness" '6 must be rejected. The same may be said for judges. If we insist
on being pragmatists, let us make an ideology out of pragmatism and repair
to Peirce and James to determine what the masters had to say. "The pragmatic
method," William James maintained, "is to try to interpret each notion by
tracing its respective practical consequences.""' I hope to persuade you that
a proposal for a constitution of human needs does have "practical conse-
quences," not only for Americans but, since the United States is so powerful,
for people the planet over. In other words, those who persist in being pragmatic
should be able to forecast the practical consequences of their actions or of
proposed public policies. It is well, in this connection, to remember that those
who got us in and kept us in the Vietnam "war," with its 58,000 American
deaths, were pragmatists to a man.' 8 The Vietnam conflict is a classic example
of pragmatism run riot, with consequences far more pernicious than practical.
13. Geertz, Ideology as a Cultural System, in IDEOLOGY AND DISCONTENT 65 (D. Apter
ed. 1965). See S. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND POLITICAL
CHANGE c.2 (1974).
14. See Anderson, Editor's Introduction: The Crisis of Liberalism in RrmNINIG LMERALISM
c.I (W. Anderson ed. 1983). But see M. WHITE, PRAGMATISM AND THE AmRICAN Mind (1973);
H. COMMAGER, THE A ERiCAN MIND (1950); R. RORTY, CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM (1982).
15. See G. MYRDAL, VALUE IN SOCIAL THEORY (P. Streeten ed. 1958).
16. P. RHINELANDER, IS MAN INCOMPREHENSIBLE TO MAN? 98 (1973). See Miller, The Myth
of Objectivity in Legal Research and Writing, 18 CATH. U. L. REv. 290 (1969); Miller & Howell,
The Myth of Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication, 27 U. Cm. L. REv. 661 (1960).
17. W. James, Pragmatism and Four Essays in THE MEANING OF TRUTH 42 (paperback
ed. 1955)(first published in 1907).
18. See D. HALBERSTAM, THE BEST AND THE BRIGHTEST (1972).
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There is more than a fleeting resemblance to the condition in which the
United States finds itself today, almost 200 years after the constitutional con-
vention, and its status as a new and underdeveloped nation under the Articles
of Confederation. The same tensions-between hierarchy and
heterarchy' 9-were visible in 1787, just as they are today, although now they
have been elevated to a different plane. Then, they were between state and
nation, and the system of federalism was the consequence; today, they are
between nation-state and an emergent global society, and no one really knows
what form society will take. The age-old problems of governance remain the
same, as indeed they have since the times of Plato and Aristotle: First, the
individual versus the collectivity called society; here the problem is one of
internal order within a given geographical area; second, the relationships
between collectivities; here the problem is that of external security. Insistent
demands on government were made in 1787 and are being made today. Then,
they came principally from those who wanted their property safeguarded. The
protection of property, said John Locke, the intellectual father of the Con-
stitution, was the principal reason for the formation of governments."0 Today,
an increasing number of groups press ever more insistently for "entitlements,"
in some respects a new form of (inchoate) property.21 The poor and the disad-
vantaged are more restive and discontented now than in the late 18th century;
and because of the spread of the franchise, they are politically much more
powerful. (It is well to note, however, that property qua property still remains
as the highest of constitutionally protected values.)22 Another resemblance is
that in 1787 Americans were poised on the edge of the First Industrial Revolu-
tion, a social transformation of great magnitude that had an immense impact
on constitutional mechanisms, whereas today we are well into the Second
Industrial Revolution, which is certain to have perhaps an even greater impact
than the First. The security of the nation was precarious in the early 19th
century, when the United States existed largely at the sufferance of the then
superpowers, France and Great Britain; today, it is even more precarious
because of nuclear weaponry and an apparently irreconcilable conflict with
another superpower.
2 3
19. The term "heterarchy" is borrowed from J. OGLIVY, MANY DIMBNSIONAL MAN 114-17
(1977). See Micheal, Neither Hierarchy nor Anarchy: Notes on Norms for Governance in a Systemic
World in RaniNqic LiEa.B.nSM 251 (W. Anderson ed. 1983).
20. Gramm, Industrial Capitalism and the Breakdown of the Liberal Rule of Law, 7 J.
EcON. IssuEs 577, 599 n.17 (1973).
21. See Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L. J. 733 (1964). See also Grey, Property and
Need: The Welfare State and Theories of Distributive Justice, 28 STAN. L. REv. 877 (1976). Cf.
Tushnet, The Newer Property: Suggestions for the Revival of Substantive Due Process, 1975
Sup. CT. REv. 261; Van Alstyne, Cracks in "The New Property," 62 CORNELL L. REv. 445 (1977).
22. See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring).
See also Lissakers, Money and Manipulation, 44 FOREIGN POL'VY 107, 107 (1981) (presidential
order freezing Iranian assets during seizure of hostages was less to punish Iran than to protect
American banks and banking system).
23. See NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND LAW (A. Miller & M. Feinrider eds. 1984) (discussion of
legal aspects of nuclear weaponry).
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Differences of course exist between the two periods. Social change was
relatively slow 200 years ago. Today, it is pandemic and built into the socio-
political order. Science and technology are now on the loose and no one knows
where they are taking us. All is movement and change. The only certainty
is uncertainty. We are back to Heraclitus. Said physicist Ralph Lapp in 1965:
"No one-not even the most brilliant scientist alive today-really knows where
science is taking us. We are aboard a train which is gathering speed, racing
down a track on which there are an unknown number of switches leading
to unknown destinations. No single scientist is in the engine cab and there
may be demons at the switch. Most of society is in the caboose looking
backward." 2 Furthermore, today we are urbanized and industrialized as com-
pared with the agricultural, small town, small shop society that was the United
States two centuries ago. In 1984, we are truly a united state; in 1787, we
were thirteen separate "sovereignties" straggled along the east coast. When
toward the end of his life, Thomas Jefferson called for division of the nation
into "wards" or "small republics" through which everyone could become "an
acting member of government, '2 5 by no means was that possible even in the
early 19th century-and surely it cannot be realized today. This is the
technological age-and technology works toward the centralization and con-
solidation of power. That harsh, unbecoming fact poses one of the fundamental
challenges to those who would think seriously about a humane constitutional
order, an order, that is, that has human needs as its principal goal.
What does this portend for American constitutionalism? What direction
will future constitutional change take? What should it take? Change there
will be, of that we can be certain, whether it comes by amendment, judicial
decree, custom, a combination of all of them, or a constitutional convention.
More precisely, will we as a nation continue to drift along, buffeted by the
winds of change, without any real idea of where we are going or why; or
will we make a concerted effort to canalize the future in directions suitable
to all? We-Americans and others-are confronted by a mind-boggling situa-
tion: the requirement to establish a reasonably satisfactory world order that
will simultaneously nourish community and self-governance while recognizing
global unity. "Act locally, think globally," Rene Dubos tells us:2 ' The ten-
sions between hierarchy and heterarchy must be resolved on a global scale.
This is a question that would challenge the greatest political minds of all time
and provide the fodder for dozens of graduate seminars. I am not so
temerarious as to do more than pose the question at this time, while maintain-
ing that the problem of constitutional alteration should be high on the agendas
of all who care about American governance or, indeed, the future of the human
race.
Many, to be sure, would disagree with that statement. They believe that
constitutional change is not necessary, possibly because we already have a
24. R. LAPP, THE NEW PRaISmooD: TE SCINTMc EUTE AND THE USES OF POWER 29 (1965).
25. See H. ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION c.6 (1963).
26. Quoted in Michael, supra note 19, at 254.
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"perfect constitution" 7 or because the Document of 1787 is malleable enough
to meet any situation.28 They cite Judge Learned Hand's statement that the
litigable parts of the Constitution are "empty vessels" into which a judge "can
pour nearly anything he will"; "9 or Chief Justice Earl Warren's valedictory
to the effect that Supreme Court Justices "serve only the public interest as
we see it, guided only by the Constitution and our own consciences' 1;31 or
even Thomas Jefferson who, angry at Chief Justice John Marshall, testily
called the Constitution "merely a thing of wax" which the Court "may twist
and shape into any form they please." ' 31 There is a partial truth in such asser-
tions. After all, the Constitution has not long prevented anything that deter-
mined majorities wished to do. It is not a complete truth, however, not just
because some of the unlitigated or nonlitigable parts of the Constitution con-
tain some substantial roadblocks to effective governance, but also because
what Don K. Price has called "America's Unwritten Constitution ' 32 institu-
tionalizes routine practices that make good government at least difficult and
often impossible. Furthermore, those who maintain that the present Constitu-
tion is, in effect, almost infinitely malleable should realize that they are really
saying that we have no constitution at all but merely the simulacrum or pretense
of one.
I do not believe that is enough, for reasons that will be developed below.
I prefer to take my cue from another statement of Jefferson's and compare
it to one by Professor Michael Kammen. First, Jefferson:
Some men look at constitutions with sanctimonius reverence, and deem
them like the ark of the covenant, too sacred to be touched. They
ascribe to the men of the preceding age a wisdom more than human,
and suppose what they did to be beyond amendment. I knew this age
well; I belonged to it, and labored with it. It deserved well of its coun-
try. It was very like the present, but without the experience of the
present; and forty years of experience in government is worth a cen-
tury of book-reading; and this they would say themselves, were they
to rise from the dead.
33
27. Cf. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 353 (1981).
28. This is often put in terms of the Constitution being a "living" instrument of governance,
an idea that is controversial in itself. Compare Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution,
54 TEx. L. REV. 693 (1976) with Miller, Notes on the Concept of the "Living" Constitution,
31 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 881 (1963); Forrester, Are We Readyfor Truth in Judging?, 63 A.B.A.J.
A.J. 1212 (1977); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (Black, J.); Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347 (1967) (Black, J. dissenting); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1963) (White,
J., dissenting). See also R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977).
29. L. HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LmERTY 81 (1. Dilliard ed. 1953).
30. 395 U.S. x-xii (1969).
31. 15 TuE WRITINGs OF THOMAS JEFMERSON 278 (A. Libscomb & A. Burgh eds. 1904-07).
32. D. PICE, AMERICA'S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: SCINCE, RELIGION, AND POLITICAL
RESPONSIBILITY (1983).
33. Quoted in W. DOUoLAS, STARE DEcisis 31 (1949).
1250
CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
Next, Kammen, who wrote in People of Paradox:
There is an awkward anomaly in American thought. Although the
founders were themselves engaged in a continuous quest for modes
of legitimacy appropriate to their times and needs, subsequent
Americans have sought to validate their own aspirations by invoking
the innovations and standards of our hallowed pantheon as unchang-
ing verities. This nostalgic vision of the Golden Age actually conjures
up an era when values were unclearly defined, when instability often
seemed beyond control, when public rancor and private vituperation
were rampant, and institutions frail and unformed.
3
1
Save for the fact that institutions are no longer "frail and unformed,"
Kammen's statement sounds remarkably like the present day.
Let me conclude this introduction by stating flatly: Each generation of
Americans writes its own constitution. 5 In the past, this has been done in
an incremental, ad hoc manner, through reactions to what Hamilton called
"accident and force." The requirement confronting Americans today is to
write one for themselves and "our posterity" de novo, all the while remember-
ing what should be obvious but is not: that we today, and particularly those
who have not reached the age of senior citizenship, are our own posterity.
People alive today will have to grapple with constitutional problems of the
first magnitude, in a social context that cannot be predicted, simply because
the extremely rapid rate of social change makes them their own posterity. It
is not your children or your children's children about whom you should be
concerned; it is you, yourself, the would-be sovereign self standing all alone
and increasingly afraid in a world you never made. Ask not, therefore, what
has posterity done for me? Ask, rather, how you who hold the proud title
of citizen can help in the transition of where we are to where we want to
be. Citizenship, Justice Hugo Black once opined, has its responsibilities as
well as its rights. 36 One of those, I am arguing, is to take part in the growing
dialogue about the need for constitutional change.
II. HuM iN NEEDS AS HuiMA RIGHTS: Ti PROBLEM EXPLAINED
I begin, then, with the proposition that the Constitution institutionalizes
a politico-economic order that has not in the past and does not now achieve
a reasonably adequate measure of social justice. I shall maintain that the only
valid end of government is the promotion, ins6far as the environment per-
34. M. KAmMEN, PEOPLE OF PARADox 56 (paperback ed. 1973).
35. See A. MILLER, ToWARD INCREASED JUDICIAL ACTIVISM: THE POLITICAL ROLE OF THE
SUREmE COURT passim (1982).
36. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (Justice Black's opinion sustain-
ing exclusion of Japanese-American citizens from West Coast during World War II). The "respon-
sibility" here, it seems, was to have one's clear constitutional rights arbitrarily denied him, mainly
liberty and property. The decision is the absolute nadir of judicial irresponsibility; or to say it
another way, it is proof positive that the Court is an arm of the executive branch of government.
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mits, of social justice. The term, social justice, of course requires specificity.
James Madison, in Federalist No. 51, was far from clear as to what he meant
by the word "justice. ' 37 Even though the slogan "Equal Justice Under Law"
is carved into the facade of the Supreme Court's building in Washington, none
of the 102 people who have sat upon that Court has proffered any definitive
meanings of either "equal" or "justice" or "law." Many, to be sure, will
dispute the idea that the proper goal of government is achievement of social
justice, however defined, but I take it as one of the givens of this discourse.
For present purposes, social justice is defined in this way: It is the idea
that the sole valid goal of government is achievement of a sustainable society,
which in turn means satisfaction of human needs and deserts so far as the
environment permits. Social justice is a form of distributive justige, concerned
in its needs aspect with the ways in which benefits are distributed in society
through its major institutions and in its deserts aspect with both negative sanc-
tions upon human behavior (roughly, punishments) and with benefits con-
ferred (one's "just deserts"). Social justice, thus, deals, with how wealth is
allocated, personal rights protected, and benefits divided among the populace.
(No special insight is required to perceive that much of constitutional law is
concerned with precisely those matters.) In short, social justice is "suum cuique,
to each his due." 38 Or, as David Miller has written, "the just state of affairs
is that in which each individual has exactly those benefits and burdens which
are due him by his personal characteristics and circumstances." 9 Among other
things, that means that equals should be treated equally.
What, however, is a person's "due"? The question is complex, and we
have little time, but some sort of answer is necessary. In essaying a response,
I start by distinguishing between the customary and the ideal in social affairs.
The former means the accepted distribution of rights, goods, and privileges,
as well as the conventional distribution of burdens and pains. These are thought,
by many at least, to be both natural and just; and thus they ought to be and
are maintained by law (including constitutional law). In short, "Whatever is,
is right," and, accordingly, worthy of protection by the state and its apparatus.
On the other hand, the ideal conception of justice looks to a system of rules
and regulations of distribution that ought to exist (although they probably
have never existed). Laws, nonetheless, are just to the extent that they
approximate the ideal. The distinction is between "conservative" and
"prosthetic" justice.4" The former has the object of preserving "an existing
order of rights and possessions, or to restore it when any breaches have been
37. THE FEDERALIST No 51 (J. Madison).
38. D. MILLER, SocIAL JUSTICE 20 (1976).
39. Id. See Freund, Social Justice and the Law, in SOCIAL JUSTICE 93 (R. Brandt ed. 1962);
Miller, Social Justice and the Warren Court: A Preliminary Examination, 11 PEPPERDINE L. Rv.
473 (1984).
40. Raphael, Conservative and Prosthetic Justice, 12 POLITICAL STUDIES 149 (1964).
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made," whereas the latter aims at "modifying the status quo.""'
A person's "due," that is, may be perceived in one of two ways: either
as protection of his present rights-"vested" rather than "civil"-or as fur-
therance of the ideal of prosthetic justice. The term rights is used here as does
David Miller: They
generally derive from publicly acknowledged rules, established prac-
tices, or past transactions; they do not depend upon a person's cur-
rent behavior or other individual qualities. For this reason, it is
appropriate to describe this conception of justice as "conservative."
It is concerned with the continuity of a social order over time, and
with ensuring that men's expectations of one another are not disap-
pointed. (emphasis added).' 2
Social justice as rights thus requires judges (and others) to protect the "is"
in society-precisely what the Supreme Court and other courts have generally
done throughout American history. The basic task of the judiciary in any
modern industrial society is to be an integral part of the governing coalition
and help to underpin the stability of the social order and protect it by resisting
serious efforts to alter it. 43 For that reason, the fundamental doctrine of
American constitutional law has long been, and still is, that of "vested rights.""'
Much of the judicially announced constitutional law, historically and contem-
oraneously, revolves around that theme.
In modern times, social justice as rights increasingly conflicts with other
perceived, albeit rather inchoate, rights-those that are herein labeled as human
needs. Tensions thereby generated make up a substantial part of present-day
public law. My position is that "the continuity of a social order over time"-I
speak here of the United States-can only be realized if certain basic human
needs and deserts are satisfied. A human need, in this conception, can be con-
sidered to be a significant, even indispensable, human right. The prime re-
quirement is for accommodation to be made between needs (justice in the
prosthetic sense) and rights (justice in the conservative sense). For the sake
of clarity, I will speak of needs as needs rather than as rights; the latter term
will be employed mainly in its conservative sense. In addition, some attention
must be paid to human deserts-what people deserve in given circumstances.
All of this must perforce be cast against the background of environmental
or ecological limits, it being idle beyond measure to discuss rights and needs
and deserts unless the milieu in which humans live and governments operate
permit their reasonable satisfaction.
41. Id. at 154-55.
42. D. MILLER, supra note 38, at 26.
43. See J. GRIFFITH, THE PoLrncs OF THE JuDIcARY (1977).
44. See Corwin, The Basic Doctrine of American Constitutional Law, 12 MICH. L. REv.
247 (1914) (early discussion of "vested rights" as fundamental doctrine of American Constitu-
tional lav). See also A. MILLER, supra note 35, passim.
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For present purposes, it is desirable to telescope the argument. I shall
be arbitrary and pay insufficient attention to deserts, on the assumption that
what a person deserves is largely a part of what he needs- not entirely, to
be sure, but enough for the moment. Negative deserts, or punishments, can
hardly be called a human need, at least for the person being punished, except
perhaps for masochists. Possibly, however, there is a psychological need in
others to know that malefactors are in fact subjected to the punitive power
of the state.
Personal-desert statements are seldom made by philosophers, legal or other-
wise, whereas personal-needs theory enjoys a considerable and growing
literature. Professor Joel Feinberg has asked: "What is it to deserve
something?" 45 and goes on to assert that a complete understanding of justice
is impossible unless the complexities of personal desert are resolved. That may
well be so, but time and space permit no more at this time than an adumbra-
tion of some of those complexities. The concept of personal desert involves
more than rewards and punishments. Any comprehensive discussion of social
justice would have to confront what Feinberg calls the "peculiar perplexities
'" 6
of personal desert. That term is not pleonastic. Persons are not the only things
that are said to be deserving. For example, art and sculpture may deserve
approval for being particularly well done; some problems-in present con-
text, the conception of human needs-may deserve careful examination and
analysis; some species-perhaps most of them-deserve to be preserved; 7 and
so on. Such statements have something to do with social justice, and even
with human needs, but they are not of present concern.
Desert, moreover, requires a basis. We should not, for example, say that
someone deserves a whipping "just for the hell of it"; and a claim that a
student's desert is to be determined on the basis of his parents' mental health
defies logic. Both assertions lack an appropriate "basal reason '"' 4 to justify
them; the first rejects a basis for personal desert and is wholly capricious and
the second simply is a logical non sequitur. Such statements offend common
sense (that most uncommon of all the senses) and therefore cannot be justified.
Take, on the other hand, the question of personal ability: is it a proper desert
basis? In one way, the answer is yes; it deals with some determinate fact about
a person. But is that enough? Is it either a good or sufficient reason for deciding
that a person deserves some reward or accolade? Here, we tread upon ground
that has become controversial in recent years, one where values (or deserts)
are in conflict, as a number of recent judicial decisions attest. The reference
here, of course, is to Bakke and DeFunis, Weber and Fullilove,49 cases in
45. J. FEINBERG, DOING AND DEsERvING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RESPONSIBIITY 55 (1974).
46. Id.
47. Compare P. EHRLICH & A. EHRLICH, EXTINCTION: THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES
OF THE DISAPPEARANCE OF SPECIES (1981) with H. MCCLOSKEY, ECOLOGICAL ETHICS AND POLITICS
(1983).
48. The term "basal reason" comes from Pitcher, On Approval, 67 PHIL. REv. 198 (1958).
49. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980); Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193
(1979); University of Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); Defunis v. Odegaard, 416
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which the Supreme Court had the difficult task of reconciling conflicting
deserts. There should be little wonder that the Justices were badly split on
their approaches to the issues in those cases, as indeed is much of American
society. Should the putative superior ability of "WASPs" (and other whites)
override an argument that black Americans deserve some special, albeit tem-
porary, treatment because they are inheritors of centuries of prejudice and
brutality? The question is merely posed here, although I do not hesitate to
say that I fully agree with the decisions in Weber and Fulliove. Bakke and
Defunis should be and, I think, are largely confined to the specific facts of
those decisions.
Desert is concerned with modes of treatment that humans should receive
from "society" or the "state"-what they deserve. Two types of desert exist.
The first is concerned with treatments with respect to persons deserving good
or ill, rewards or punishments, praise or blame. Should Mr. Rummel be jailed
for life for three minor crimes?5" Should Mr. Hutto be jailed for forty years
for a small drug violation? 1 Should Carrie Buck be involuntarily sterilized
because she is considered to be mentally defective?52 Should Richard Nixon,
the well-known criminal, have received a full pardon, plus all of the perquisites
a generous Congress gives to former presidents? Does Whittaker Chambers
deserve a posthumous Medal of Freedom? Should Felix Frankfurter be con-
sidered to be a "great" Justice of the Supreme Court?53 Much of the criminal
law, as well as considerable private law, falls into this first category.
The second type of desert divides people not in accordance with rewards
and punishments but in terms of those who deserve and those who do not.
Traditionally, the first type of desert has been called retributive justice, whereas
the second type falls into the category of distributive justice. Competitive situa-
tions illustrate the latter: prizes in contests and grades in schools, among others.
In other words, "X deserves Y because of Z," with X being a person, Y a
mode of treatment, and Z some determinate fact about X. What types of
treatments do persons deserve from others? The question brings us back full
circle: I answer in general terms by stating that deserved treatments are closely
connected with human needs. Feinberg maintains that "the bases of desert
vary with the mode of deserved treatment." 5 There is, however, more to the
U.S. 313 (1974); see also M. PHLipS, THE DmIEMMAs oF INDIvUuALIsm: STATUS, LIBERTY, AND
AimicAN CON TrruTiONAL LAW (1983). Since the text of this article was written, the Supreme
Court decided Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, - U.S. -, 104 S. Ct. 2576
(1984). This is another decision on conflicting constitutional deserts. I take no position on it
at this time.
50. See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
51. See Hutto v. Davis, 445 U.S. 947 (1980).
52. See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
53. I should make my position clear: I consider Frankfurter to be the most overrated judge
in American history. For some of the reasons leading me to this conclusion, see Miller & Bowman,
"Slow Dance on the Killing Ground". The Willie Francis Case Revisited, 32 DE PAuL L. REv.
1 (1982).
54. J. FEINBERG, supra note 45, at 61.
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second type of desert statement than competitive situations. Under what cir-
cumstances may a person validly be said to deserve something-positively,
in the form of benefits; negatively, in the form of deprivations-is a large
question the discussion of which must be deferred to another time and another
place. It is enough now to maintain that the human being, simply because
of his humanness, deserves to have his basic needs fulfilled insofar as is
environmentally possible. In Professor Thomas Grey's formulation, there is
"a right in each person to have his basic material needs met by his society
to the extent that he is unable to meet them by his own efforts." '5 3 As will
be seen, I add other human needs to what Grey calls "basic material needs."
The concentration here is upon human needs-what, in general, they are;
and how, again in general, they might be satisfied through use of legal and
other constitutional mechanisms. Before entering that intellectual thicket, it
is desirable to refer to the historical and contemporaneous context in which
American constitutionalism was born, burgeoned, and presently exists. Two
points will be made. First, the institutions characteristic of what will be called
the orthodox conception of constitutionalism arose at a particular time and
in a particular place; today, those institutions appear to have run their course.
Second, Americans seem to be poised on the edge of authoritarian govern-
ment; if so, constitutionalism as it has been received and understood in this
country surely must be examined anew to determine its viability. Of necessity,
I must be brief.
First: The end of a 400-year boom.5 6 During the past 400 years many
institutions and beliefs that Americans consider to be the natural order of
things were born: representative democracy, the private enterprise economic
system, and the individualistic basis of law, among others. Were one to ask
why they appeared at roughly the same time and in a limited geographical
area, what would be the answer? Recognizing that there is no simple and com-
plete explanation of any social phenomenon," let alone a set of them, history
does provide at least the beginnings of a clue. Those "natural" institutions
and the very concept of constitutionalism itself were, I believe, in substantial
part consequences of the wealth and free land that became available after the
Great Discoveries that began with Columbus. Many Europeans were thereby
enabled to escape an ecological trap, with its concomitant authoritarian institu-
tions, that had imprisoned them in rigid class, even caste, systems throughout
previous human history.
A static society gave way to one of permanent revolution. The ancient
and medieval worlds were closed. Space, rather than being infinite, was con-
55. Grey, Property and Need: The Welfare State and Theories of Distributive Justice, 28
STAN. L. REv. 877, 897 (1976). Cf. Michelman, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through
the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARv. L. REv. 7 (1969).
56. I draw upon a previously published article in these paragraphs. See Miller, supra note
7; see also 8 NOVA L. J. 1 (1983) (for slightly different version of same article).




sidered to be a solid sphere in which the stars were embedded. Time, too,
would end in a short time. Learning was limited in amount and to a small
few who had the leisure and intelligence to grasp abstract concepts. People
believed that the final truths on all subjects had already been written, if not
in the Bible then by Aristotle and other ancient philosophers. The Bible was
Holy Writ, the ultimate truth for religion and for cosmology. Those who
thought and wrote did so within a closed body of knowledge. With rare
exceptions, such as Copernicus and Galileo, they were confined to refining
the accepted wisdom of the day. The universe was anthropocentric: Earth was
its center and man was the special creation of an all-knowing and all-wise
supreme being. It was an authoritarian, even totalitarian, age-in politics and
economics and religion. Most people lived lives of penury and want, quietly
desperate about what seemed to be the unchanging natural order of things.
The Copernican Revolution smashed the intellectual structure of the time,
as John Donne wailed: " 'tis all in peeces, all cohaerence gone." The Great
Discoveries opened new vistas and permitted new social institutions to blossom
and grow. I wish to avoid being thought to be simplistic, but I do think that
it is valid to hypothesize that the Discoveries created the conditions that allowed
the birth and burgeoning of our familiar politico-economic institutions. For
the first time, a high value was placed "on the rational manipulation of the
environment"; in turn, this became two elements: "rationality, and . . . the
Faustian sense of mastery over man and nature.""8 Rationality, according to
Professor David Landes, is "the adaptation of means to ends." 9 Supersti-
tions are pushed to the back of the mind (only to erupt centuries later). The
ends of social effort became the production and acquisition of material wealth.
That mind-set still abides, although whether it can for much longer is very
much an unanswered question.
We live today at a time when revolution has been made a perpetual
institution, not in the sense of the violent overthrow of government (although
that is far from unknown elsewhere) but rather as a permanent feature of
socio-economic and thus of political institutions. The underlying assumptions,
the metaphysic, of society have been altered. Human life on earth, in the
Western world at least, rather than being thought of as a prelude to heaven
or hell, became an end in itself. It became possible, at least for a time, to
think of the conquest of the "material world in human interest, of providing
the conditions for a good life on this planet without reference to any possible
hereafter." 6 The ideas of progress, of a unilinear advance toward a better
and better world and of the perfectability of man, flowered. Rather than liv-
ing in the final days before Armageddon, humankind saw itself as participating
in the continuing improvement of the human lot. Instead of having a somber
58. D. LANDES, TiE UNBOUND PROMETHEUS: TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND INDUSTRIAL
DEVELOPMENT IN WESTERN EUROPE FROM 1750 TO THE PRESENT 21 (1969).
59. Id.
60. Beard, Introduction to J. BURY, THE IDEA OF PROGRESS: AN INQUIRY INTO ITS ORIGIN
AND GROWTH (paperback ed. 1955).
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melancholy, people became optimistic. No problem was considered to be
insoluble, it being the humanistic vision that people, through applied reason,
could not only know but solve all problems. Faith in an all-wise God was
transferred to faith in scientists and technologists, who were and are thought
to be able to create technological "fixes" that could and would ameliorate
the severities of life. Economics developed from mercantilism-a statist
economy-to laissez-faire, private-enterprise capitalism, although it is impor-
tant to remember that the state has always been and still is important as a
protector of and stimulant to business. The individual human being was per-
ceived as the basic unit of society, a belief that crept into and dominated law
and legal institutions. In sum, the modern age was born.
My point is not that a direct causal connection necessarily existed between
those developments and the Great Discoveries, but, rather, that only after
the Discoveries did the new institutions and beliefs come into existence in a
small part of the planet (Western Europe and some of its colonies). An
environment was provided in which new ideas and concepts could flourish.
The cultural basis for the familiar institutions of constitutionalism came into
being. The 400-year boom lasted until about the beginning of the 19th century
for most of Europe and until about 1970 for the United States. Since those
times, those patterns of social behavior began to become unraveled. That sug-
gests my second point.
Second: The dawning of a new age of authoritarianism." As the impetus
of the 400-year boom winds down, it has become increasingly obvious that
we are witnessing the dying of constitutionalism as it has been known and
understood in the Western world and particularly in the United States. "It
is ironic," Professor Sanford Levinson observes, "that a culture which has
experienced a centuries-long 'melancholy, long-withdrawing roar' from religious
faith can believe so blithely in the continuing reality of citizens organized around
a constitutional faith. The 'death of constitutionalism' may be the central event
of our time just as the 'death of God' was that of the past century."' 2 A
necessary brevity will, unfortunately, make the present discussion seem over-
simplified, but that cannot be helped. My main point is that the coming of
the National Security State, a condition that formally began some forty years
ago," has foreboding auguries for the American constitutional order. We are
knee-deep into a condition that Auguste Comte once described as "popular
dictatorship with freedom of expression."" That requires explanation.
61. This is based upon Miller, Reason of State and the Emergent Constitution of Control,
64 MINN. L. REv. 585 (1980); A. MILLER, DEMOCRATIC DICTATORSHIP: Tim EMERGENT CONSTITU-
TION OF CONTROL (1981).
62. Levinson, "The Constitution" in American Civil Religion, 1979 Sup. CT. REV. 123, 151.
63. See Raskin, Democracy Versus the National Security State, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
189 (1976). See also NATIONAL SECURITY AND AMERICAN SOCIETY: THEORY, PROCESS, AND POLICY
(F. Trager & P. Kronenberg eds. 1973).
64. A. COMTE, SYSTEM OF POSITIVE POLITY (1851).
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The United States has been, I believe, in a continual state of war since
1939, when President Franklin Roosevelt secretly aided Great Britain at the
beginning of its struggle with Hitler's legions." World War II saw the emergence
of what Clinton Rossiter aptly called a "constitutional dictatorship.
'66
Beginning in 1945, and perhaps a few months before, the United States entered
into a period of "cold war" with the Soviet Union. Richard Nixon, among
others, has called this the beginning of World War 111.6 7 I believe that Nixon
was essentially correct. For forty years we have been locked in mortal combat
with the USSR, not directly to be sure, except in the rhetoric, but indirectly.
Two major wars have been fought, in Korea and Indo-China, at a tremen-
dous cost in blood and treasure to the United States. The Soviets have been
able to fight with surrogates and have suffered only minor material losses.
Add the several subventions by the Untied States to stave off what was con-
sidered to be Russian expansionism, some covert (as in Guatemala and Iran),
some overt (as in the Dominican Republic), and some-in the peculiar Orwellian
language of the day-covert actions that are widely known (as in Nicaragua).
Add, furthermore, the existence of nuclear weapons in plethoric quantity, and
it may readily be seen that we and the world are teetering on the edge of
nuclear holocaust. The meaning of all this is the creation of the National
Security State (NSS) which has what I have elsewhere called the Constitution
of Control 6" as its governing system.
With the coming of the NSS, the principal desideratum of public policy
has become just that-national security. The contours of the NSS may be
seen in a wide range of congressional, presidential, and judicial decisions. For
Congress, the point of departure is the National Security Act of 1947, a statute
that established the National Security Council in the White House, set up the
Central Intelligence Agency, and reorganized the Department of Defense. For
the President, the still secret executive order establishing the National Security
Agency6 ' is a prime example, as are the "wars" in Korea and Indo-China.
As for the courts, a series of Supreme Court decisions that began not later
than Quirin and Hirabayashi and Korematsu and runs through Dennis and
Barenblatt and O'Brien,"' among others, clearly evidence that the judiciary,
not excluding the Supreme Court, is a part of the governing coalition of the
65. See W. STEVENSON, A MAN CALLED INTREPID: SECRET vAR (1976). See also J. ToLAND,
INFAMY: PEARL HARBOR AND ITS AFTERtATH (1982).
66. C. ROSSITER, CONSTITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP: Cusis GOVERNMENT IN THE MODERN
DEMOCRACIES (1948).
67. R. NIXON, Tim REAL WAR (1980), quoted in Dugger, On to World War IV?., THE PRO-
GRESSIVE, June 1982, at 20. See Kenworthy, Reagan Rediscovers Monroe, 2 DEMOCRACY No. 3,
July 1982, at 80 (quoting organization calling itself The Committee of Santa Fe to effect that
we already are in the "third phase of World War III").
68. See supra note 61 (works cited).
69. See J. BAniwoRD, THE PUZZLE PALACE (1982) (first comprehensive discussion of NSA).
70. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S.
109 (1959); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943); ExParte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
19841 1259
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:1243
nation and entirely in synchronization with the avowedly political branches
of government. At no time has the state lost when any matter of importance
was being litigated, important as perceived through the eyes of that ill-defined
but nonetheless existent group called the Establishment. The Pentagon Papers
and Steel Seizure' cases are not to the contrary.
There is an apparent paradox here. At a time when increasing controls
are being placed upon individual behavior, there seems to be the highest pro-
tection of human rights and liberties in American history. Certainly that was
true during the years of the Warren Court. This poses the question of why
were reasons of freedom and liberty preferred, often at least, over reasons
of state. An answer, admittedly tentative, is not difficult to locate. It is two-
fold. First, as already mentioned, the state always wins in any matter con-
sidered to be important by those who wield effective control in the polity.
In large part, the protection of human rights in the modern era is more
ostensible than real. Second, the rights and liberties received protection most-
ly in the formal as distinguished from the living or operative Constitution.
I am suggesting that a subtle tradeoff has taken and is taking place. As privacy
disappears and as the burdens of the state upon the person, through taxation
and otherwise, become more pervasive, we are witnessing the enhanced pro-
tection of liberties of a relatively innocuous nature. No decision of the Warren
Court can be said to be truly revolutionary in the sense that fundamental social
patterns were rearranged. Thirty years after the path-breaking decision in Brown
v. Board of Education,7" which might be said to have been an effort to alter
social patterns in America, the change has been mainly in the formal law.
Blacks in fact are not much better off than they were prior to Brown."' True
enough, they can now eat at restaurants and stay at motels from which they
had been barred and some-a relative few-have prospered in their profes-
sions. On the whole, however, America still remains a nation characterized
by eleven percent of its population that, despite the formal law, still remains
separate and unequal. (That is a sobering lesson for those who attempt to
use law to satisfy human needs.)
The "price" paid for steadily increasing social controls over the individual,
controls that emanate from both public and private governments, creates the
71. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Youngstown Co. v. Sawyer,
343 U.S. 579 (1952).
72. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown-I); 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Brown-II). See Bolling v. Sharpe,
347 U.S. 497 (1954).
73. See A. MILLER, A "CAPACITY FOR OUTRAGE": THE JUDICIAL ODYSSEY OF J. SKELLY
WaIo c.3 (1984); R. WOLTERS, THE BURDEN OF BROWN: THIRTY YEARs OF SCHOOL DESENGREGA-
TION (1984); Patterson, The Black Community: Is There a Future?, in THE TIRD CENTURY:
AMRICA AS A POST-INDUSTRIAL SoCIETY 243 (S. Lipset ed. 1979). The essential problem-let's
face it-is white racism, which shows no signs of diminishing. See Report of the National Ad-
visory Commission on Civil Disorders (1968) (concluding that "Our nation is moving toward
two societies, one black, one white-separate and unequal").
1260
CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
paradox: an apparent higher protection of liberty and a concomitant enforce-
ment, for the first time in American history, of the Bill of Rights. Hence my
conclusion that Comte was correct: We are moving steadily into a condition
of a type of "democratic dictatorship" 7 ' accompanied by freedoms of expres-
sion broadly defined. Not much more than a casual glance at the media is
required to conclude that more controls over the individual self are not only
possible but are in fact being imposed. Privacy is an example. The Supreme
Court has read it into the Constitution.75 But at the same time, as a lawyer
friend who is the director of a large West Coast bank told me a few years
ago, "privacy is dead in this country."" 6 I do not think he was exaggerating.
When one contemplates the capacities of the National Security Agency to
intercept electronic and other messages the world over-capacities that have
been used and may in fact still be used against Americans-one is given pause. 7
There is little place to hide from the all-seeing eye.
The protections given freedoms of expression-to civil rights and liberties
generally-in the past thirty to forty years repose mainly in the formal Con-
stitution rather than the Constitution in operation. No matter how strongly
judges may articulate principles of human freedom, it should always be
remembered that while judges, including those on the Supreme Court, can
and do propose, others can and do dispose. Over those others, including but
not limited to lower court judges, federal and state, the Justices have little
or no control.7 8 The adversary system and the case or controversy require-
ment of litigation demand a willing and able (financially, in the main) plain-
tiff to enforce the norms articulated by an activist judiciary. Seen in this way,
entitlement programs, beginning with the New Deal and constitutionalized by
the Supreme Court, were and are a means of buying off social discontent
from among the disadvantaged. Nothing truly basic in the social order has
been changed. Furthermore, enhanced formal protection of civil rights and
liberties coincides almost exactly in time with what was America's true golden
age-the quarter-century following the end of World War II, when the dollar
was sovereign in world currency, American military might supreme, and
economic growth seemingly to last permanently. The larger economic pie that
resulted enabled an increasing number of people, those formerly among the
"have-nots," to sup at the groaning table of opulence that was the American
74. See A. MILLER, DEMOCRATIC DICTATORSHIP: Tim EMERGENT CONSTITUTION OF CONTROL
(1981).
75. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
76. He prefers to remain to remain anonymous. Cf. J. BAMNoRD, supra note 69; Miller,
Privacy in the Modern Corporate State, 25 AD. L. REv. 231 (1973); D. WISE, TBE AMERICAN
POLICE STATE (1976).
77. J. BAMrOPD, supra note 69. See Jabara v. Webster, 691 F.2d 272 (6th Cir. 1982).
78. See Murphy, Lower Court Checks on Supreme Court Power, 53 Am. POL. SCI. REv.
1017 (1959); Note, Evasion of Supreme Court Mandates in Cases Remanded to State Courts
Since 1941, 67 HAXv. L. Rav. 1251 (1954); Note, State Court Evasion of United States Supreme
Court Mandates, 56 YALE L. J. 574 (1947); See also THE IMPACT Or SUrPRME COURT DECISIONS:
EMPnuCAL STuDIrS (T. Becker ed. 1969).
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economy. Wide disparities in wealth still remained, but the golden age per-
mitted the realization of rising expectations in the form of entitlements. The
American version of the welfare state was the result. This condition ended,
with seeming abruptness, about 1970. We are now entering a period when
the ecological trap appears to be closing once again; we have become "the
zero-sum society."" That means more and more controls over individual
behavior. 0
If I am correct in what was said about the trend toward an authoritarian
government, no one should think that the American people, taken generally,
will balk at increasing controls. Quite the contrary. As Herbert McClosky and
Alida Brill have documented,8 1 Americans on the whole have little regard for
what many call our precious rights and liberties. It would, for example, be
highly likely that, if put to a vote today, both the Declaration of Independence
and the Bill of Rights would not command a majority at the ballot box. Say
McClosky and Brill:
We conclude with an observation with which we began-that civil
liberties are fragile and susceptible to the political climate of the time.
Hard-won civil rights and liberties are not eternally safeguarded, but
are highly vulnerable to assaults by strategically placed individuals
and groups who find certain rights or liberties morally offensive,
dangerous to safety and stability, and devitalizing to the political order.
Such assaults become especially threatening when the civil liberties
under attack do not enjoy widespread popular support. This . . . is
often the case, a result in great part of large segments of the popula-
tion to have effectively internalized the libertarian norms to which
the American political culture, from the beginning, has been
dedicated.82
Freedom, far from being innate in the human soul, is a sometime thing, "a
frail and tenuous reed, slow to take root, rare, and often short-lived." 83 That
has been so since the beginnings for the United States, as Professor Leonard
Levy has shown,8 4 and is even more so today. As the age of scarcity-the
79. See L. TmuRow, Tim ZERO-SUM SOCIETY: DIsTRmIBunoN AND THE Possmnr=rls FOR
ECONOMIC CHANGE (1980).
80. Arnold Toynbee forecast in 1975: "In all developed countries, a new way of life-a
severely regimented way-will have to be imposed by a ruthless authoritarian government." Christian
Sci. Monitor, Feb. 10, 1975, at 10.
81. H. McCosKY & A. BRIL, DIMENsIoNs OF ToLERAcE: WHAT AMERICANS BELIEVE ABOUT
Crv-L LmERTIES (1983).
82. Id. at 437-38.
83. Id. at 13.
84. L. LEVY, ed. FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PREss IN EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY: LEGACY
OF SUPPRESSION (1963): "The persistent image of colonial America as a society that cherished
freedom of expression is a sentimental hallucination that ignores history. The evidence provides
little support for the notion that the colonies hospitably received advocates of obnoxious or detestable
ideas on matters that counted." Id. at x"ix.
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zero-sum society-emerges, authoritarianism beckons. To avert it and other
deleterious features of the emergent Constitution of Control is one of the press-
ing constitutional problems of the day.
A venture into the area of human needs is not a foray into terra incognita.
A large literature exists on the subject-not, however, for reasons not at all
unfathomable, in the materials on law and legal systems. Lawyers think in
terms of rights, with a right being defined in limited terms: something that
a person can get a court to recognize and impose a duty on someone else
to satisfy it. At this time, it is not necessary to do more than point out some
of the relevant factors that should go into thinking about human needs and
the capacity of law and constitutions to fulfill them.
First, I begin with what should be obvious but is not: Society is fundamen-
tally constitutive of the individual."5 A political order made up of "abstract"
persons, in the Lockean or Rousseauian sense, has never existed. People have
always had to deal with real people, and, indeed, other people with definite
views, passions, preferences, strengths, and weaknesses. The social self is what
is important. John Dewey recognized this;86 and Professor Michael Phillips
has recently summarized the point: "The 300-year march of the sovereign self
and its detached, egoistic, manipulative posture toward man and nature seems
to be reaching its limits." 87
Once it is seen that the individual is important only as a member of a
group or groups, and indeed receives his identity mainly in that way, human
needs become somewhat easier to locate and define. Those needs are associative.
"Society is not only necessary for the survival of man, qua organism, it is
crucial for the emergence of man, qua human. To develop a mind and a self
it is necessary that the infant lives in a human society and acquires its cultural
heritage." 88 If that be so, as it is, then it presents the difficult question of
whether there are human needs common to all societies. The question cannot
be more than posed here. Of necessity, the following discussion of human
needs is directed toward those attributable to the United States (with some
reference to Western Europe). Whether needs identified as basic for Americans
can be extended planet-wide is a question central to any serious discussion
85. See L. HOBHOUSE, TnE ELEMsS OF SOCIAL JUSTICE 140-41 (1922); C. MERRIAM, PUBLC
AND PRIVATE GOVERNMENT 16 (1944) ("As Aristotle said centuries ago, the isolated individual
does not exist except as a stone hand. The lone individual does not figure either in family rela-
tions, in neighborhood relations, in state relations, in social relations, or in the higher values
of religion. Nowhere is he left without guiding social groups, personalities, and principles.").
86. See J. DEwEY, Tim PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS 188 (1927) ("The human being whom
we fasten upon as individual par excellence is moved and regulated by his association with others;
what he does and what the consequences of his behavior are, what his experience consists of,
cannot even be described, much less accounted for, in isolation."). See also J. DEWEY, HUMAN
NATURE AND CONDUCT: AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (1922) (individual achieves
meaning only in his relations with others).
87. M. PHILLIPS, supra note 49, at 207.
88. Spiro, Human Nature in Its Psychological Dimensions, 56 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 19,
24 (1954).
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of constitutionalism today. It must be answered at some time; but all that
can be done now is to ask it.
The "society" that gives identity to and meaning for the naked ape called
Homo sapiens is both local and planetary, tribal and universal. Constitu-
tionalists, accordingly, must "act locally" while thinking "globally"; they must
be concerned with both heterarchy and hierarchy, with the identifications and
loyalties one unavoidably has to his immediate surroundings and with the need
for perceiving that human problems are in fact neither local nor national but
universal. The universe is defined here as the planet Earth, for it seems to
be fatuous beyond measure to think in terms of extraterrestrial colonization
or of interactions with sentient beings from elsewhere in the cosmos. "No
man is an island, entire to himself," remarked the poet. So it is with nations.
That, of course, adds an entirely new dimension to constitutionalism and to
the tasks with which constitutions must deal.
The goal of a constitution of human needs is the creation and maintenance
of a sustainable society.' 9 Recognizing the circularity, a sustainable society
is one in which human needs and human deserts are satisfied within the con-
straints of the environment. I should like at this time to focus on the basic
requirement of acknowledging that any constitution must be seen as reflective
of environmental or ecological constrictions. Both Edmund Burke and Niccolo
Machiavelli have made the point well. Said Burke:
I cannot stand forward, and give praise or blame to anything which
relates to human actions, and human concerns, on a simple view of
the object, as it stands stripped of every relation, in all the nakedness
of metaphysical abstraction. Circumstances (which some gentlemen
pass for nothing) give in reality to every political principle its
distinguishing colour, and discriminating effect. The circumstances
are what render every civil and political scheme beneficial or noxious
to mankind. (emphasis added).90
Surely Burke was accurate: Those who would speak of constitutions and con-
stitutionalism must pay strict attention to "circumstances"-to, that is, the
environment in which politico-legal institutions exist and operate. In this con-
nection, we must recognize that the ecological trap, which Hobbes saw but
Locke denied and which is implicit in Burke, is once more snapping shut-
slowly, to be sure, but apparently inexorably.
As with Burke, so with Machiavelli, who counseled the need of adapta-
tion to the environment: "in human affairs men should study the nature of
89. Cf. L. BRoWN, BUILDING A SUSTAINABLE SOCIETY (1981); 22 TECHNOLOGICAL FOECASTINo
& SOC. CHANGE 93-210 (1982). (several essays in symposium on role of private sector in building
sustainable society).
90. Quoted in D. SCHAAFR, JUSTICE OR TYRANNY? A CRITIQUE OF JOHN RAwLs's A Theory
of Justice 42 (1979).
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the times and act accordingly .... I have often thought that the reason why
men are sometimes unfortunate, sometimes fortunate, depends upon whether
their behavior is in conformity with the times."' 91 If people are to enjoy good
fortune, they and their institutions must adapt themselves to the times. (The
times today call for a fundamental alteration of existing constitutional
mechanisms.) Machiavelli meant that a complete contextual analysis is necessary
in thinking about the art of governance. He went on to observe:
The downfall of cities also comes about because institutions in republics
do not change with the times, as we have shown at length already,
but change very slowly because it is more painful to change them since
it is necessary to wait until the whole republic is in a state of upheaval;
and for this it is not enough that one man should change his own
procedure. 92
In this comment lies the seed of an idea that may well determine whether
a new constitution for the United States can even be seriously considered,
let alone drafted and promulgated. Earlier, the Florentine stated that "those
[states and religious institutions] are better constituted and have a longer life
whose institutions make frequent renovations possible, or which are brought
to such a renovation by some event which has nothing to do with their con-
stitution. For it is clearer than daylight that, without renovation, those bodies
do not last.' 93 The requirement, in sum, is to become at one with nature,
for without such an equilibrium, civilization and perhaps the human race are
surely doomed. Americans are not accustomed to such ideas, and tend to
strenuously resist them, principally because of the favorable circumstances in
which they have lived for almost 200 years. But that condition, as has been
noted, is now over. Strict attention must be paid to "the limits to growth"
and to the conservation and preservation of resources, all within the boun-
daries of what will later be called an "optimum" population.
As a final prefatory observation, I maintain that human needs, however
defined, cannot and will not be satisfied by some as yet unknown series of
technological fixes. Only the most fatuous kind of Micawberism enables many
humans-for example, Herman Kahn and Julian Simon"'-to contemplate the
future roseately. People everywhere are faced with a congeries of terrible
vulnerabilities-possible nuclear holocaust, an exploding population,
environmental degradation, and enormous disparities in material well-being-
that, taken in their entirety, are a series of crises that have become the
"climacteric" of humankind. Whether relatively modern politico-economic
91. N. MACHIAVELLI, THE DISCOURSES, III. 8.
92. Id. at III. 9.
93. Id. at III. 1.
94. See H. KAHN, THE ComING Boomi (1983); J. SIroN, THE ULTmIATE RESOURCE (1982).
Micawberism refers to the character in Dickens' David Copperfield, who was sublimely certain
that something would always turn up to solve problems.
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institutions, such as liberal democracy, private enterprise capitalism, and con-
stitutionalism as it has been known and understood, can weather the storms
that lie dead ahead is a crucial question for constitutionalists. Stated senten-
tiously, my answer, already adumbrated, is a flat negative. But try we will,
as try we must, to survive the onslaught that is certain to come. This lecture
is an effort in that direction.
Second, I leave the area of constitutionalism, broadly conceived, and enter
the foggy domain of psychology and sociology. This is necessary simply because
lawyers tend to be narrow-minded technicians little interested in the larger
questions of human life or even of constitutionalism." Although many others
have discussed human needs, no one can analyze such needs without referring
to the late Abraham Maslow. I am, accordingly, not probing into unknown
territory in seeking to determine the relevance of human needs theory to con-
stitutionalism. Many others have dealt with the question of basic needs,
including Erich Fromm, Michael Harrington, Amitai Etzioni, Herbert Marcuse,
William Galston, Christain Bay, and David Miller. The point is that there
is a large body of literature that has, in general, been untapped by constitu-
tional scholars. The time has come to do so, to plumb the depths of human
needs theory and determine the extent to which there is a consensus on those
needs and whether needs can be translated into constitutional precepts.
James C. Davies has observed that no one can expect people to participate
in politics, which is what constitutions are all about, until certain basic human
needs are met.96 Needs theory is not only a means to explain political behavior
but also is a basis for judging polities and political institutions. If one believes,
as I do, that satisfaction of human needs (and deserts) is the ultimate purpose
of politics, an entirely new justification of constitutional government emerges.
Needs and deserts imply, perhaps demand, a correlative obligation on the part
of the collectivity (or collectivities) in which we all live to take action designed
to satisfy them. Government, that is, should no longer be perceived through
Lockean eyes-as the means of protecting private property-but in the affirma-
tive sense of so arranging society that the equality principle writ large becomes
part and parcel of our constitutional lore. This, be it noted, is a modern idea.
As Professor John H. Schaar has observed, both the ancients, such as Plato
and Aristotle, and the medieval political theorists were profoundly
inequalitarian. 9" Equality as a goal of human endeavor is in many respects
derivative from the impact of the Great Discoveries upon Western social struc-
tures. For the first and only time in human history, people could seriously
think about equality-of opportunity, certainly, and even of condition-as
95. See J. SHICLAR, LEGALISM (1964).
96. J. DAvrEs, HuMAN NATURE IN PonTics (1963). See also Davies, The Development of
Individuals and the Development of Politics, in HUMAN NEEDS AND PoLrrics 74 (R. Fitzgerald
ed. 1977). The several essays in this book merit close study by anyone interested in human needs
and constitutionalism.
97. Schaar, Some Ways of Thinking About Equality, 26 J. POL. 867 (1964).
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a possible and even achievable goal. That it may be an impossible dream has
not entered into the American ethos; it still remains in the ideal, however much
actual practice may vary from that ideal. My point, in sum, is that human
needs by definition require collective recognition and satisfaction. And that
means, as will be demonstrated, a continuing presence of the government in
social affairs. Some of us may not like that; but avoid it we cannot.
The locus classicus of human needs theory is that of Abraham Maslow.
In a seminal article published more than forty years ago he posited the following
list of needs: 8
1. Physical (biological) needs, such as air, water, food, sex, etc.;
2. Safety needs, the assurance of survival and of continuing satisfaction
of basic needs;
3. Affection or belongingness needs;
4. Esteem needs, by self and others; and
5. Self-actualization or self-development needs.
Maslow considered these needs to be both instinctive and universal. To
him, furthermore, they were hierarchical: satisfaction of the first is necessary
before the second can be addressed, and so on. In his words:
There are at least five sets of goals, which may be called basic needs
.... These are briefly physiological, safety, love, esteem, and self-
actualization. . . .These basic goals are related to each other, being
arranged in a hierarchy of prepotency. This means that the most prepo-
tent goal will monopolize consciousness and will tend of itself to
organize the recruitment of the various capacities of the organism.
The less prepotent needs are minimized, even forgotten or denied.
But when a need is fairly well satisfied, the next prepotent ('higher')
need emerges, in turn to dominate the conscious life and to serve as
the center of organization of behavior, since gratified needs are not
active motivators. 99
Others, of course, have proffered definitions. Professor C. B. Macpherson
rejects Maslow and asserts that Karl Marx provided a better model: "Labor
in the broadest sense-creative transformation of nature of oneself and one's
relations with one's fellows. This, Marx held, was the truly human need."' 0 0
(Marx, it will be recalled, stated in a famous passage: "From each according
to his ability and to each according to his needs.") Professor Marvin Zetter-
baum reads Hobbes and Rousseau and Marx as maintaining "the primacy
of recognition as a basic human need, if not the basic human need";' 0' and
98. Maslow, A Theory of Human Motivation, 50 PSYCHOLOGICAL REV. 394 (1943), reprinted
in A. MASLOW, MOTIVATION AND PERSONALITY c. 5 (1954).
99. Id. See Bay, Needs, Wants, and Political Legitimacy, 1 CAN. J. POL. Sc. 241 (1968).
100. Macpherson, Needs and Wants: an Ontological or Historical Problem?, in HriAN NEEDS
AND PoLITCS 26, 34 (R. Fitzgerald ed. 1977).
101. Zetterbaum, Equality and Human Need, 71 Ail. PoL. Sci. REV. 983, 986 (1977). See
L. STRAUSS, ON TvxANNv 205 (1968) ("Both doctrines [i.e., Hobbes's and Hegel's] construct
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goes on to remark "one may indeed say with Professor Leo Strauss" that
the course of political philosophy since Hobbes "is marked by the assumption
that man as man is thinkable 'as a being that is guided by nothing but a desire
for recognition'." ' 2 Zetterbaum further observes: "we cannot escape the notion
that the recognition and defense of self is a basic human need, if not the basic
human need."'0 3 To Professor William A. Galston, the concept of need has
a threefold classification: natural need, social need and luxury.0 4 Natural needs
are "the means required to secure, not only existence, but also the develop-
ment of existence."" Developmental needs include adequate nurturance,
adequate education, institutions that permits a wide range of capacities, and
friendships and social relations. Dostoyevsky's Grand Inquisitor maintained
that humans needed miracle, mystery and authority more than freedom.0 6
Professor Edgar Bodenheimer, writing about philosophical anthropology and
the law, listed equality, liberty, and security as the most important values
"which law is designed to protect and promote."'' 0 Finally, Professor Chris-
tian Bay maintains that there are three ranges of basic needs: "physical sur-
vival and health needs, social belongingness and participation needs, and
individual subjectivity needs"-in that order of importance.108
What may be said about these varying definitions? Several conclusions
are possible. First, human needs theory is a significant part of philosophical
and psychological discourse. Second, although the definitions differ in greater
or lesser part, each of the quoted authors does agree, at least implicitly, that
human needs are associative in nature and can only be realized through some
collectivity. This in turn implies the requirement for some sort of government;
and that means that human needs are indeed relevant to constitutions and
constitutionalism. Third, the concept of human needs as a philosophical and
jurisprudential construct is complex and controversial. If accepted, as I think
it must be, it calls for reorientation of orthodox thinking about law and legal
institutions.
I should like to emphasize the second of those conclusions. Human needs
must be viewed as the needs of individuals within a social organization. "The
'good' or 'healthy' society," Maslow has said, "would be defined as one that
human society by starting from the untrue assumption that man as man is thinkable as a being
that lacks awareness of sacred restraints or as a being that is guided by nothing but a desire
for recognition.").
102. ZErrERBAUM, supra note 101, at 986.
103. Id. at 990.
104. W. GALSTON, JUSTICE AND THE HUMAN GOOD 164 (1980).
105. Id.
106. F. DOSTOYEVSKY, THE BROTHERs KARAmAzov.
107. Bodenheimer, Philosophical Anthropology and the Law, 59 CAUF. L. REV. 653, 662
(1971).
108. Bay, Thinking About Human Rights: A Contribution to Postliberal Theory, in RaTnNK-
ING LIBERALIsM 269, 277 (W. Anderson ed. 1983).
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permitted man's highest purposes to emerge by satisfying all his prepotent
needs."'' 9 It is with that thought in mind that I suggest that the goal of
American constitutionalism should be creation and maintenance of a sustainable
society. Maslow's views are altered to the extent that he does not take into
consideration environmental constraints, something that surely is indispensable
in considering the satisfaction of a person's prepotent needs. We cannot, that
is, assume with Locke and Rousseau that humans ever lived in a state of nature,
historically or contemporaneously. L. T. Hobhouse made the point in these
words:
The organizer of industry who thinks that he has "made" himself
and his business has found a whole social system ready to his hand
in skilled workers, machinery, a market, peace, and order-a vast
apparatus and a pervasive atmosphere, the joint creation of millions
of men and scores of generations. Take away the social factor and
we have not Robinson Crusoe, with his salvage from the wreck and
his acquired knowledge, but the naked self living on roots, berries,
and vermin. Nudus intravi should be the text over the bed of the suc-
cessful man, and he might add sine sociis nudus exirem.'"
So much for a definition of human needs. The goal of government in the
United States is to help satisfy needs, however defined, to help individuals
everywhere attain a condition of dynamic homeostasis. In like manner,
societies-in present context, the United States of America-should seek to
attain and maintain a plateau of dynamic equilibrium. To achieve such condi-
tions, constitutionalists must consider not only the American people but peoples
everywhere.
I have suggested in this section that certain basic human needs should
be identified by constitutionalists, who should then bend their efforts toward
their realization. A number of questions have been left dangling, including
the troubling problem of how to reconcile conflicting human needs. Some
observations by Professor H. J. McCloskey will serve to conclude this section:
I wish to suggest that talk about human needs, to be meaningful and
useful, must be spelt out in terms of natural goods, goods based on
human nature and human ends, where the ends are determined by
our natures, either in terms of movement from the potential to the
actual in the sense evident in much liberal writing, or in the teleological,
purposive sense, as in Thomist natural law ethics ...
I am therefore suggesting that, ceteris paribus, needs are things
which ought, where possible, to be available, not withheld, prevented,
and indeed, be supplied where necessary; that where needs cannot be
109. Fitzgerald, Abraham Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs-An Exposition and Evaluation,
in Hi iA NEEDS AND POLmCS 36, 38 (R. Fitzgerald ed. 1977).
110. L. HOBHOUSE, supra note 85, at 140-41.
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met, society or the world ought to be reordered as far as possible,
so that they are capable of being met, or obtained by the person with
the need, provided that greater goods are not thereby lost or jeopar-
dized; that talk of human needs and needs of particular persons
involves reference to natures, the perfection, development, non-
impairment of which are good."'
To put my point in traditional terminology, satisfaction of human needs should
be considered to be the basic human right. If that requires, as it does, reorder-
ing society, as McCloskey suggests, it is long past time that that portentous
question be faced. It cannot be burked.
III. TAKING NEEDS SERIOUSLY: THE PROBLEM EXPLORED
I ani proposing two things. First, we as humans have a right, at least
in the ideal, to satisfaction of those human needs that human action can
reasonably be expected to satisfy. There is no reason at this juncture to choose
from among the several definitions of human needs, although surely it is cor-
rect to say that if Maslow's is not followed, a viable alternative should be
proffered. Second, we as humans do not have a right to satisfaction of needs
that the environment, broadly defined, will not accommodate. Homo sapiens
lives not only in an organizational society, but also reacts to and is affected
by the total planetary milieu.
This section delineates several questions, each pertinent to the larger discus-
sion and each aiming at contributing to an understanding of our fundamental
question: Were the Constitution to be rewritten today, what provisions would
be put it it? What should be put in it? Here, again, I do not write on a tabula
rasa. Others have addressed the problem in the past and others are doing so
today. As for the former, Rexford Tugwell and Leland D. Baldwin'" come
to mind; as for the latter, a Committee on the Constitutional System, recently
formed by Lloyd Cutler and Douglas Dillon," 3 evidences a high degree of
concern about the present-day viability of ancient constitutional mechanisms.
Obviously, the following questions overlap; they should not be considered
discretely.
111. McCloskey, Human Needs, Rights and Political Values, 13 AM. PHIL. Q. 1, 7 (1976).
112. See L. BALDWIN, REFRAMING THE CONSTITUTION: AN IMPERATrE FOR MODERN AMERICA
(1972); R. TUGWELL, THE EMER.GiNG CONSTIrUTION (1974). No doubt others are pursuing parallel
lines of inquiry. For one such effort, published-in all places-in Esquire, see MacDonald, Updating
the Constitution of the United States, EsQuIRE, May 1974. See also J. BuRNs, THE POWER TO
LEAD: TnE CRISIS OF Tm AmERICAN PRESIDENCY (1984).
113. The Committee consists of several dozen lawyers, political scientists, journalists, and
other interested people. It has offices at 1775 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C.
20036, and its executive director is Peter Schauffler. It is fair to say that the Committee has
not yet tackled the systemic problems which are the focus of this essay. See Miller, It's Time




1. What type of society do Americans want? And what type of govern-
mental apparatus would be best suited to achieve it? Answers to these ques-
tions are indispensable. Without them, no amount of constitutional tinkering,
by amendment or otherwise, or no amount of constitutional drifting, by
updating the Constitution through interpretation, will do much more than paste
Band-Aids on the outside of an unwieldy and increasingly inadequate con-
stitutional structure. The problems confronting Americans today are systemic.
They cut to the core of the organization of society. They cannot and will not
be cured by small changes. Whether they can be rectified by large changes
and whether law, including the fundamental law of the Constitution, is suffi-
cient to the need are difficult questions that must also be confronted and
resolved.
I have suggested above that pragmatism, as such, is inadequate to the
manifest requirements. A constitution of human needs (and deserts) necessitates
something more than the "muddling through" 1 4 that has long characterized
American policy-making. Before he became a mover and shaker of events,
Professor Henry Kissinger made the same basic point in an essay about
policy-making." ' So, too, with Dean Acheson, who once remarked that
Americans follow what might be called the "aspirin theory" of
policy-making." 6 We call our problems headaches, said Acheson, and believe
that they are curable with a quick fix (an aspirin tablet); we do not realize
that the problems of governance will always be with us, rather like the pains
of individuals making a living.
Nations, like individuals, must know what they want and strive to attain
it. The goals or ends of society cannot be determined through the exercise
of human reason. As Professor Herbert Simon has said, "Reason, taken by
itself, is instrumental. It can't select our final goals, nor can it mediate for
us in pure conflicts over what final goal to pursue-we have to settle these
issues in some other way. All reason can do is help us reach agreed-on goals
more efficiently." 17 (With that statement, Simon substantially undercuts most
of what passes for constitutional scholarship today.) Goals are culturally deter-
mined; they cannot be promulgated by fiat. Laws can help us achieve such
goals, and even can help educate the populace along lines that will assist in
setting those goals, but we must recognize that, as Iredell Jenkins has observed,
114. See C. LINDBLOM, THE POLICY-MAKING PROCESS (1968).
115. H. KISSINGER, THE NECESSITY FOR CHOICE 342 (1961).
Pragmatism, at least in its generally accepted forms, produces a tendency to identify
a policy issue with the search for empirical data. It sees in consensus a test of validity.
Pragmatism is more concerned with method than with judgment. Or, rather, it seeks
to reduce judgment to methodology and value to knowledge. The result is a greater
concern with the collection of facts than with the interpretation of their significance.
The point is that principle or purpose is lost, action is substituted for thought, and a series of
ad hoc adjustments are made. That will no longer do.
116. Quoted in Spaeth, Book Review, 1 STAN. L. REv. 179 (1948).
117. H. SIMON, REASON IN HUMAN AFFAIRS 106 (1983).
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law, however and by whomever promulgated, is neither sovereign nor
omnicompetent. 8
Pragmatism is inadequate today because social conditions have changed
so radically since it came into prominence. It was the "philosophy" appropriate
to a developing nation that was the United States during the 19th century,
by providing a means for social experimentation and maneuver. Errors in judg-
ment could be and were made but the ultimate results were generally satisfac-
tory, simply because pragmatism and the social conditions of the era permitted
a margin for error. That age, I have argued above, is over. The requirement
today, and surely in the future, is for an avowed ideology-something alien
to the American mind but something that has become a prerequisite to serious
thinking about constitutionalism. That ideology, I am suggesting, is one that
should be built around the fundamental notion that the only valid end of
government is to satisfy human needs within environmental constraints.
2. What is the environment in which the future Constitution must exist
and operate? Even if not changed in any substantial manner, the Constitution
will have to deal in the next fifty years with problems as yet not known or
even unforeseeable. Rapid social change will continue, of that there can be
little doubt. Already, however, at least two major trends are discernible. Taken
together, they completely alter the milieu in which constitutional institutions
must operate. Only an outline can be given here.
First, the society relevant to constitutionalism is global, not national and
certainly not local. The meaning is clear: human needs qua needs and qua
rights must be analyzed in the context of the entire planet. The earth has become
what Marshall McLuhan called a global village but which is more accurately
labeled a global city. The urbanization of the world is proceeding at a rapid
clip. Constitutionalists must, therefore, not only proceed from the proposi-
tion that needs must be perceived in their social setting but that the society
involved is the so-called world community. No nation, certainly not the United
States, can isolate itself in lonely splendor from the remainder of the planet.
That adds a major new dimension to any consideration of what constitutions
are and what they should be. I am not suggesting at this time the development
of a constitution for the world community, although that may not be a bad
idea,' 19 but have the lesser goal of demonstrating that the American constitu-
tion and constitutionalists must resolutely confront the fact that the United
States is perhaps the most important single unit of a planet divided into nation-
states. The Constitution of 1787 is largely silent about foreign affairs; the
spare provisions of the Document, and its silences, were left to gather content
from experience. That no longer suffices. Too much is left to chance and hap-
118. I. JENKiNS, SOCIAL ORDER AND THE LIMTS OF LAW: A THEORETICAL ESSAY (1980).
119. The structure of the United Nations may be seen as a struggling and as yet feeble attempt
along those lines. That the "state system" is verging on obsolescence, or has already reached
that point, seems to be increasingly obvious. See R. FALK, THE END OF WORLD ORDER (1983).
1272
CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
penstance. A constitution of human needs must perforce be one that recognizes
and directly deals with the demands and expectations of peoples the world
over. Said another way, in the late 18th century the continuing viability of
the several states was an important question of public policy; 200 years later,
the continuing viability of the nation-state as a form of social order is an
equally important, even crucial, question of public policy.
Second, the planet on which we live is both endangered and endangering.
It is endangered in main part because of the exponential growth in human
numbers since about 1650. We are still on the upswing of a "J-curve" of
population growth. More than 4.7 billion people now throng the earth; by
the year 2000 that figure will be at least six billion, with the bulk in the Third
World. That very mass of humans is contributing to-is the major cause of-
the rapid extinction of other species, to depletion of rain forests and other
flora critical of humankind's welfare, and to the spread of environmental
degradation in general. Earth is endangering because of a runaway technology
that seems to be beyond human control, a technology that has not only pro-
duced weapons of destructive power that civilization itself is threatened but
also has, through new health techniques, enabled people to live longer than
ever before. The "crisis of crisis" or "climacteric" that humans everywhere
are now experiencing can in major part be traced to the impact of technology
upon the social structure.
No one seems to know how to tame technology, to ensure that it is
employed for humane ends, to avoid the deleterious second-order consequences
of what are otherwise beneficent techniques. We must deal with what Max
Weber called "the seemingly irresistible advance of routinization, rationaliza-
tion and bureaucratization,"' 2 0 all the product of technological change. Jacques
Ellul has taken Weber a giant step further. Focusing on what he calls "tech-
nique," he notes "the transition from the individualist to the collectivist
society." Ellul defines technique as more than machines, technology, or pro-
cedures for attaining a goal. "In our technological society, technique is the
totality of methods rationally arrived at and having absolute efficiency (for
a given stage of development) in every field of human activity. Its characteristics
are new; the technique of the present has no common measure with that of
the past."' 2 ' Technique imposes centralism upon the economy. In politics,
the technocrat views the state as an enterprise providing services that must
function efficiently. In turn, efficiency requires administration (bureaucracy).
These two factors-no doubt there are others-add up to the fact that,
as Fritjof Capra has observed, humans are at a great turning point in history, 22
one that necessitates development of a new paradigm to replace the outmoded
120. W. MOINISEN, TIE AGE OF BUREAUCRACY: PERSPECTIVES ON THE POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY
OF MAX WEBER 103 (1974).
121. J. ELLUL, THE TECHNOLOGICAL SocIET 305 (J. Wilkinson trans., paperback ed. 1964).
122. See F. CAPRA, THE TURNING POINT: SCIENCE, SOCIETY, AND THE RISING CuLTuRE passim
(1982).
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Newtonian-Cartesian paradigm that was so influential in Western thought.
In net, the environment that constitutionalists must deal with today and in the
future is almost completely different from that of 1787. If it is accurate, as
I think it is, that laws and even constitutions tend to be more a posteriori
that a priori, the consequences are obvious for the American constitutional
order. The two factors also present the challenge of whether humans can use
law and constitutions to create a better social order-what was above called
a sustainable society.
3. How can the indubitable governing power of private groups be curbed
and channelled? This question cuts to the core of governance in the world
community (regarding the position and power of multinational corporations
and other transnational private groups) and internally in the United States
(as in the theory of political pluralism and its present-day viability in the
domestic constitutional order). It is one of the cardinal questions of modern
constitutionalism. In this section, I shall be brief and concentrate upon the
giant corporation as being prototypal of private groups generally.' 
3
That groups called private under orthodox legal theory in fact exercise
governing power should occasion no surprise. In total impact, they probably
are as important as the organs of public government. Since, moreover, the
two forms of government (public and private) are closely interwined, they
are creating in the United States, as well as elsewhere, an indigenous form
of corporatism. The admixture of public and private power, for that matter,
is far from a new development; to some degree, it has always characterized
the American political economy. In section IV, I will suggest that constitu-
tional norms should be applied to socially important private groups.
During the past century, perhaps as Galbraith' 24 has said because of
technological imperatives, corporations have waxed increasingly large and
strong. Many straddle the United States; and most of any real consequence
operate in many other countries. This apparently is in accord with the apparent
wishes of the Founding Fathers, particularly Alexander Hamilton. When in
1866 the Supreme Court discovered through a blinding flash of revelation that
the corporation was a person within the meaning of the fourteenth amend-
ment's due process clause,"' what the framers started and what received a
major impetus from the Marshall-Taney Courts became utterly clear: American
was to be a corporate society, perhaps the corporate society par excellence.
This was affirmed when the Justices wrote their own version of the Sherman
123. For further discussion by the present author, see, for example, A. MILLER, THE MODERN
CORPORATE STATE: PRIVATE GovERMENTS AND THE CONsTIUoN (1976); Miller, "Constitutionaliz-
ing" the Corporation, 22 TECHNOLOGICAL FORECASTING & Soc. CHANGE 95 (1982); Miller, A Modest
Proposal for Helping to Tame the Corporate Beast, 8 HOFSTRA L. Rv. 79 (1979); Miller, The
Constitutional Law of the "Security State," 10 STAN. L. REv. 620 (1958).
124. J. GALBRAITH, Tim NEw INDUSTRIAL STATE (1967).
125. See Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886).
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antitrust law in 191126 and when, in 1932,127 they determined through a
marvelous intuition known only to them that bigness in and of itself is no
violation of the antitrust laws. Those laws have become both a mere charade,
as Thurman Arnold once observed,'"" and a welfare state for many lawyers.
The time has come-indeed, it is long past-when the governing capacities
of corporations are recognized in legal and constitutional theory. Two points
are pertinent here. First, the governance of corporations by government is
more ostensible than real. Corporate charters, which even under the Dart-
mouth College' 9 doctrine could give leverage against corporations, are mere
simulacra of control. Stockholders, as individuals, own but do not control;
self-appointed oligarchies are in charge of the firms. Second, governance of
Americans by corporate managers is an indubitable fact of life. They do so
in the internal orders of the companies, whose activities are a form of political
order. The "iron triangles" of Washington, D.C. illustrate how corporate
management has a significant role in the formulation of public policies. The
triangle consists of the industry supposedly being regulated, the relevant
administrative agency, and the congressional committee having jurisdiction.
(Professor Hugh Heclo prefers the term "issue networks," but the effect is
the same.)'3
Corporations are governments and should be recognized as such. They
have, however, only a thin claim to legitimacy for their power to rule. Dean
Edward Mason asked in 1959: Who selected corporate managers "if not to
rule over us, at least to exercise vast authority, and to whom are they respon-
sible? The answer to the first question is obvious: they selected themselves.
The answer to the second question is, at best, nebulous. This, in a nutshell,
is the problem of legitimacy."'' This is the age of collective action. The
American economy is dominated by huge corporate combines not even remotely
in the contemplation of those who wrote theConstitution and the Bill of Rights.
126. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
127. See United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106 (1932). For a discussion of how the
Supreme Court helped further corporate growth, see W. ADAMS & H. GRAY, MONOPOLY IN AMERICA
(1956).
128. T. ARNOLD, THt FOLKLORE OF CAPrrALism (1937). See W. ADAMS & H. GRAY, supra
note 127, at 2. Adams and Gray state:
Our thesis is that the currently popular deterministic explanations of economic concen-
tration are inaccurate and misleading, that concentration is largely an artificial,
institutional phenomenon which originates in, or derives sustenance from, the actions
and policies of the federal government. Our study indicates that some of these policies,
whether or not so intended, have had a profound effect on the structure of the economy,
that they have served to promote concentration and to restrict and weaken competi-
tion; in short, that the federal government-although by tradition, popular regard,
and legal mandate the defender of competition-has by a process of function perver-
sion become one of the principal bulwarks of concentration and monopoly.
129. See Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518 (1819).
130. Heclo, Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment, in Tim NEw AiumcAN PoLrncAL
SYsTEM 100 (A. King ed. 1978).
131. MASON, Introduction to THE CoRPoRAo N IN MODERN SOCrETY 5 (E. Mason ed. 1959).
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Decisions made in corporate boardrooms, on such matters as investment, prices,
and plant location, directly affect, and thereby govern, Americans as well as
people elsewhere. Corporations are authoritative institutions for the alloca-
tion of value; they largely determine how prices are set and economic rewards
bestowed and are changing the nature of property itself. They "legislate" the
terms and conditions of most contracts through use of standardized forms.
As hierarchical bureaucracies, they are the local self-governments of much
of American society-"the logical successor to manor, village, and town." '
3 2
In addition to being part of the iron triangles of the policy-making process,
they use private judiciaries (arbitrators), have extensive intelligence services,
run fleets of aircraft, and employ "private" armies in their security forces.
That corporations are private governments is far from a novel idea. John
Davis maintained in 1897 that their growth in Western Europe and the United
States "signifies nothing less than a social revolution,"' 33 an insight extended
by Arthur Bentley in 1908: "A corporation is government through and through.
.. Certain technical methods which political governments use, as, for instance,
hanging, are not used by corporations, generally speaking, but that is a
detail.' 1 34 This is obviously true within the United States and in recent years
has become equally true in the world community. The multinational corpora-
tions govern themselves; they are powers unto themselves. We thus find
ourselves in a condition where such corporations as Exxon are more important
economically and politically than most of the fifty states and have assets greater
than most nation-states. Yet in the peculiar language of the American legal
system-and others, be it said-they are considered to be as private and no
greater in contemplation of the law than you or I. In our Orwellian world,
corporations are not only constitutional persons, they are "more equal" than
natural persons. They have constitutional rights but no concomitant constitu-
tional duties. A natural person can be forced to fight and even to die for
the collectivity called the United States, but not an artificial person (the cor-
poration). If it "fights," as it can be required to do, it has guaranteed profits.
No corporation has ever died in defense of the United States. Natural persons
have other constitutional duties, such as being required to serve on juries,
but not corporations: they have no constitutional duties. A parlous situation,
indeed. The problem that constitutionalists must confront is how corporate
power can be so canalized that economic (and political) power that is necessary
can be made as tolerable and decent as possible.
A corollary exists to what was said immediately above: the political order
known as pluralism is in obvious disarray, and has been for some time.
Pluralism "worked" during the 19th century because only one truly impor-
tant social group existed: the business enterprise. It does not work today-it
132. Drucker, The Meaning of Mass Production, 57 COMMONWEAL 547 (1953).
133. J. DAVIs, CORPORATIONS (1897).
134. A. BENTLEY, THE PROCESS OF GOVERNMENT 268 (1908).
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does not, that is, even pass the test of pragmatism-because of the prolifera-
tion of other groups, each exercising political power and each with demands
and expectations sought and enforced along narrow, parochial lines. In essence,
there is no way, save in widely acknowledged emergencies (such as World War
II), for enforcement of the over-all national or public interest except as it
emerges from the joustings of the interest groups of the nation.' The com-
mon good inevitably gives way to recognition and furtherance of private rights.
The consequence, Professor Michael J. Sandel asserts, is that "our public life
has withered, our sense of common involvement diminished, [and] we lie
vulnerable to the mass politics of totalitarian solutions .... Our most pressing
moral and political project is to revitalize those civic republic responsibilities
implicit in our tradition but fading in our time." 136 That is not quite correct:
it is doubtful that "civic republican responsibilities" were adhered to at any
time in American history. Sandel, however, is correct in saying that the need
is to discover and enforce them "in our time." As noted, Americans no longer
have the room for maneuver provided by the frontier. The requirement, in
a word, is for a form of "communitarianism"'"I to replace the bankrupt
individualism that now characterizes the nation.
IV. TKNuGo NEEDS SERIOUSLY: THE PROBLEM
ANSWERED (AT LEAST TENTATIVELY)
We come, finally, to the crux of our inquiry: To what extent can con-
stitutional change-legal change, in any form-help create a sustainable society?
Can human needs be satisfied by conscious, purposive legal action? Are there
limits to effective legal action? Must constitutional change, to be effective,
be accompanied or preceded by a change in values, in the ethos of the American
people? I readily concede that we have been a long time reaching this point;
but the introductory matter was necessary to set the context for what follows.
Recall, in this connection, Alexander Hamilton's question about whether people
can establish good government or whether they must forever react to external
exigencies without being able to direct or control their destinies. We have seen
enough in what has previously been said, that Hamilton's question, as of today,
is unanswered. True enough, the fifty-five men who met in Philadelphia that
hot summer of 1787 (out of eighty-four who had been invited), and the thirty-
nine who signed the Document then drafted, managed to create a structure
of government that has done duty for almost two centuries. But the exogenous
135. See Friedmann, Corporate Power, Government by Private Groups, and the Law, 57
CoLui. L. REv. 155 (1957) (discussing "reserve function" of state).
136. Sandel, Morality and the Liberal Ideal, Tim NEw REPUBLIC, May 7, 1984, at 17. See
M. SANDEL, LIBERAIISM AND THE Lnrrs OF JUSTICE (1982).
137. See G. LODGE, THE NEW AmIUCAN IDEOLOGY c. 6 (1975). "America now appears to
be heading into a return to the communal norms of both ancient and medieval worlds"; "our
atomistic, individualistic ideology constitutes a fundamental aberration from the historically typical
norm." Id. See also G. LODGE, Tua AirmcAN DISEASE (1984).
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circumstances that made that success possible have, as has been noted, now
disappeared. It is time to rethink the problem.
I believe that we should begin our formal answer with the concession that,
as Barbara Tuchman recently observed, the thing that humans do worst is
govern themselves. In her language: "Mankind, it seems, makes a poorer per-
formance of government than of almost any other human activity."' 3" This
is a variation on what Professor David Ehrenfeld, in an important but neglected
book, has called "the arrogance of humanism" 3 -the idea that humans
through the exercise of reason can plan their affairs in a manner reasonably
adequate to all. Politics-political science or political economy-is the most
difficult of all fields of application. Compared to it, even the most abstruse
questions in natural science are relatively easy. The reason is not hard to locate.
Scientists tackle only those questions that give some promise of solution; the
locus classicus is Einstein's E = MCI, a magnificent intellectual achievement.
But even Einstein's brain, as well as the collective brains of others, have been
unable to solve the conundrum of the human being and his relationships with
others.
Second, we should also acknowledge, without further exploring, that limits
to effective legal action do exist. Something more than a change in law is
necessary to produce significant social change. Law, to be sure, is important
and indeed indispensable; but it is a tool. Although it can be and is instrumen-
tal, it cannot by itself set the ends or goals of societal action. Consider, in
this connection, the way in which the formal law, of the Constitution and
of the statutes, has been altered concerning the position of blacks in society.
The formal law bespeaks a condition of equality (of opportunity but certainly
not of condition) but the informal or living law shows a different face. Blacks
remain as second-class citizens in the main; only a few have been able to
bootstrap their way out of America's underclass. Even those who have become
affluent or successful still find themselves the butts of discrimination in one
form or another. Whites simply will not accept blacks as social equals. That
is a harsh, even unpleasant, truth. I mention it only to illustrate what should
be obvious: Changes in the positive law, even in the fundamental law of the
Constitution, do not necessarily mean changes in the attitudes and behavior
patterns of those affected. Legal change requires a change in the value struc-
ture of the people. To believe otherwise is fantasy.
If that be so, as surely it is, then why go through what some may consider
a futile exercise of proposing constitutional alterations? The answer is two-
fold. First, we will never get correct answers to social problems until correct
questions are asked.'" One way of asking them is to look to the structure
138. B. TucHmAN, THE MARCH OF FOLLY 4 (1984).
139. D. ERRENFELD, THE ARROGANCE OF HmsmIsM (1978).
140. As Justice Frankfurter opined in Estate of Rogers v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 410,
413 (1943): "In law also the right answer usually depends on putting the right question." And
in Priebe & Sons v. Untied States, 332 U.S. 407, 420 (1947), Frankfurter stated: "but answers
are not obtained by putting the wrong question and thereby begging the real one."
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of the Constitution (broadly defined). Second, as has been noted, there is an
educational value in what admittedly is utopian thinking. Not for nothing is
Plato's Republic still studied. And although they may be considered to be
anti-utopian, Machiavelli's The Discourses and The Prince are the actual albeit
unacknowledged vade mecum of statecraft.' 4' Moreover, although it is true
that we cannot escape the past, it is also accurate to maintain that we live
today in an historically unique situation. The "climacteric" confronting
humankind knows no historical parallel.' 2 What Plato and Aristotle,
Machiavelli and Locke, Hume and Rousseau, Marx and Jefferson, to name
only a few, had to say should be read in the contexts of their times, none
of which remotely resembled the present. Our times pose different problems,
which although on a high level of abstraction may be similar to those that
have always existed, nonetheless require a different type of analysis and
disquisition.
My answer to the question of achievement of a constitution of human
needs will consist, in the main, of setting forth some generalized statements
of what constitutions should do in the modern age. They will be accompanied
by some references to history. I shall suggest that a constitution must do at
least four things-structure government, delineate the obligations of govern-
ment, set forth limits on government, and provide for a way of systematic,
meaningful change in the fundamental law-and will take them up in that
order.
1. The structure of government. We must begin, of course, with the world
as it is, not as we wish it to be, and suggest a series of problems that should
be confronted by anyone who wishes to think about what a constitution should
do. The most prominent feature of the world today is its political division
into nation-states, each claiming sovereignty over a designated piece of ter-
ritory. Some are huge and some are small unto insignificance, but all share
that common attribute of sovereignty. That, of course, is obvious and would,
if analysis could end there, be no occasion for further comment. But analysis
cannot stop there. Sovereignty today, even for the superpowers, exists only
in the positive law. Delve below the surface of positivism and a bewildering
web of interactions quickly become apparent. The net result is that no nation
is truly sovereign in the politico-economic or sociological sense. Each depends
in greater or lesser degree upon resources or aid of some sort from other
nations. The living law of the world community consists more of cooperation
than of conflict. Nations simply must deal with others. Just as natural per-
sons attain their identity and significance from being a member of a group,
141. For a brief discussion of the American experience, see Miller, Reason of State and
the Emergent Constitution of Control, 64 MINN. L. Rv. 585 (1980). See also Paust, Is the Presi-
dent Bound by the Supreme Law of the Land?-Foreign Affairs and National Security Reex-
amined, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 719 (1982).
142. Cf. W. McNEILL, THE GREAT FRONTIER: FREEDOM AND HIRcry IN MODERN TmsS
(1983). See also A. MILLER, DzMocRATic DICTATORSHIP: TiE EMERGENT CONSTITUTION OF CON-
TROL (1981) (discussing climacteric and its probable effect on American institutions).
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so it is with nations. It is idle, even useless, to think .of them as separate entities.
Rather, they are parts of a larger whole. There may be, as Chief Justice John
Marshall once opined, a "perfect equality of nations,"'' 43 but that equality
lies only in the political sphere (as in the General Assembly of the United
Nations). Obviously, as Professor Robert Tucker has argued, nations are
unequal. 44 Other than in the realm of politics, nations are equal mainly in
their interdependencies. None can exist without close and continuing relation-
ships with many others.
From this it follows that when considering the structure of government
under any constitution, attention must be paid to those relationships. Provi-
sion must be made, in some way, for them to be recognized in the written
constitution. The Constitution of 1787, other than making foreign relations
a monopoly of the national government, was more an invitation to debate
about foreign policy than a delineation of what should be done and who should
decide.' 45 That no longer suffices. The further meaning is that the structure
of government under any constitution must be perceived on two levels-the
formal and the operative; or what Walter Bagehot called the difference between
the "dignified" parts of a constitution, those which "excite and preserve the
reverence of the population," and the "efficient" parts, by which "it, in fact
works and rules."'' 46 Woodrow Wilson made the same point when he observed
in 1885 that "The Constitution in operation is manifestly a very different thing
from the Constitution of the books."'1
47
The clear implication of this is that although the Constitution applies only
in the territorial jurisdiction of the United States-in general, it does not
"follow the flag"-that is accurate only in its formal sense (Wilson's "Con-
stitution of the books"). The operative fundamental law differs, even today:
Under Article VI, the numerous treaties and executive agreements to which
the United States is a party are "the supreme law of the land." They are
constitutive actions which in their totality make up a body of at least inchoate
constitutional law that extends "the Constitution in operation" far beyond
the nation's borders. That body of law, in my judgment, is far more than
a mere inchoation (although not studied as constitutional law).' 48 Even some
143. In The Antelope, 10 Wheat. 66, 121 (1825).
144. R. TUCKER, THE INEQUALITY OF NATIONS (1979).
145. See E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS (4th ed. 1957); L. FISHER, THE
POLITICS OF SHARED POWER: CONGRESS AND THE EXECUTIVE (1981); A. SOFAER, WAR, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS AND CONSTITUTIONAL POWER: THE ORIGINS (1976); F. WILCOX, CONGRESS, THE EXEcUTIVE,
AND FOREIGN POLICY (1971).
146. W. BAGEHOT, THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION, quoted in Dorsey, Constitutional Obliga-
tion, in POLITICAL AND LEGAL OBLIGATION 179, 182 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1970).
147. W. WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT 30 (1885).
148. They fall more into the category of international law, although why the principles should
not be studied as a branch of constitutional law remains mysterious. Compare C. JENKS, THE
COMMON LAW OF MANKIND 58 (1958) with W. FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 70 (1974).
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of the attributes of political sovereignty have already been ceded by the United
States to larger-than-national organizations. NATO is an example, the Inter-
national Monetary Fund another, and international commodity agreements
comprise a third. Others exist, but need not be listed. My point may be simply
stated: However much the perfervid "patriots" in the American Legion or
Daughters of the American Revolution may disagree, the United States has
already moved into an era of at least multinational, although far from
worldwide, resolution of some of its public policy problems.
The question is whether that beginning should be extended and formalized
in the Constitution. Professor Paul A. Freund once asserted that any
thoroughgoing commitment to larger-than-national institutions would require
a constitutional amendment' 49-which may well be accurate. My point is that
constitutionalists must, of necessity, take the world community into considera-
tion. America's place in the world community, as set forth in the Constitu-
tion, would eliminate in some part at least the policy by drift and happenstance.
That place should be a planned development, not the product of "muddling
through" the impacts of "accident and force." The pulls and tugs between
hierarchy (a strong national government) and heterarchy ("states' rights") have
long characterized the American experience. Similar tensions are evident today
on the higher plateau of the emergent hierarchy of multinationalism if not
true internationalism and the heterarchy of the state system. ' The problem
is to develop a constitutional instrument that will retain the nation-state as,
in Bagehot's label, its "dignified" core while simultaneously allowing its
"efficient" parts to operate on a larger scale. People will not lightly give up
their national allegiances. They identify with them: Nationalism or Americanism
is the civil religion of much of America.
The spread of corporate business throughout the world helps to create
the sociological basis for development of a constitution that transcends
nationalism. Every American corporation of any consequence carries on a con-
siderable part of its activities overseas. What happened in the United States
in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, when corporations spread nation-
wide, seems certain to be paralleled in the world community. The giant cor-
porations were one of the major factors altering the traditional system of
federalism in the United States; today, they seem to be doing the same for
nationalism.
The primary characteristic of the Constitution of 1787 was divided political
power-in the federal system, in the separation of powers, and in the silences
149. Freund, Law and the Future: Constitutional Law, 51 Nw. U. L. REv. 187, 194-95 (1956).
150. See Miller, Constitutional Law: Crisis Government Becomes the Norm, 39 Omo ST.
L. J. 736, 742-44 (1978). Cf. The Economist (London), Apr. 29, 1978, at 89 ("It has seldom
been more important to gear national policies to fit international goals, rather than the other
way around."). See also Common Crisis North-South: Cooperation for World Recovery 8 (2d
Report of the Brandt Commission 1983) (Willy Brandt noting "the grim political and economic
confusion engulfing our societies everywhere").
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of the Document, the principal one being the division between political and
economic power (in the Political and Economic Constitutions). 15' Lord Acton
has suggested how the framers structured government:
The Americans proceeded to give themselves a Constitution which
should hold them together more effectively than the Congress which
carried them through the war, and they held a convention for that
purpose in Philadelphia during the summer of 1787. The difficulty
was to find terms of union between the three great states-Virginia,
Pennsylvania, Massachusetts-and the smaller ones, which included
New York. Therefore one chamber was given to population, and the
other, the Senate, to the states on equal terms. Every citizen was made
subject to the federal government as well as to that of his own state.
The powers of the states were limited. The powers of the federal
government were actually enumerated, and thus the states and the
union were a check on each other. That principle of division was the
most efficacious restraint on democracy that has been devised; for
the temper of the Constitutional Convention was as conservative as
the Declaration of Independence was revolutionary.
The federal Constitution did not deal with the question of religious
liberty. The rules for the election of the president and for that of
the vice-president proved a failure. Slavery was deplored, was
denounced, and was retained. The absence of a definition of State
Rights led to the most sanguinary civil war of modern times. Weighed
in the scales of Liberalism the instrument, as it stood, was a monstrous
fraud. And yet, by the development of the principle of Federalism,
it has produced a community more powerful, more prosperous, more
intelligent, and more free than any other the world has seen.' 52
That is an interesting statement, but not entirely correct. It was "constitu-
tional fetishism"' 53 on Lord Acton's part to attribute the virtues he listed
in the final sentence to federalism. As we have already seen, the power, pros-
perity, intelligence, and freedom of Americans are 'really attributable to
exogenous environmental factors than to the provisions of the Constitution.
The framers did establish the national government of enumerated powers and
left the states with mainly residual powers. The states, 200 years ago, were
the stronger side of the duo, evidenced, for example, by John Jay declining
151. For discussion of the Political and Economic Constitutions, which are combining into
the Corporatist Constitution, see Miller, Toward A Definition of "The" Constitution, 8 U. DAYTON
L. REv. 633 (1983).
152. LORD ACTON, LECTUREs ON MODERN HISTORY 295 (paperback ed. 1960). Americans,
of course, are not accustomed to having their Constitution labeled as "a monstrous fraud," and
as said in the text. Acton was wrong in attributing the nation's affluence and power to a con-
stitutional principle.
153. I take the term "constitutional fetishism" from F. NEUMANN, THt DEaMOCRTIC AND
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appointment to the Supreme Court to become governor of New York. '
The legal basis for a strong national government was created in large part
by the Marshall-Taney Courts. Public policy became nationalized, in the for-
mal law, not without opposition, to be sure, as evidenced by John C. Calhoun.
Legal process could not do the job of nationalization alone; the Civil War
completed the task of makipig the United States a united state. Federalism
has not been the same since, not merely because of judicial decisions and the
Civil War, but because of the marriage of capital to technology created the
social basis for a unified nation. What Justice Robert H. Jackson once called
a national common market ' was created. Today, the states exist more as
administrative districts for centrally established policies (public and private)
than as sovereign entities. Such states as Texas and California, true enough,
have size and economies greater than most nations. But the fact remains that
200 years after the constitutional convention, federalism tends to be more func-
tional than formal.'56 The problem that this poses is obvious: If Americans
want a true federal system, with strong local governments, they are going to
have to move in the direction of regions rather than states as the units of
federalism.' 7 That a movement toward interstate cooperation exists is well
known; it is sanctioned by the Constitution of 1787. "The interstate compact
device, supplemented by commissions on interstate cooperation and by uniform
legislation, is today producing cooperation among the States on a grand scale
even if it has not fulfilled all of its promise." 58 The point is that state govern-
mental officials quite often are at least tacitly acknowledging that some public
policy problems require a larger-than-state handling and resolution.'59 The ques-
tion this presents is whether that movement should be solidified in a new con-
stitution. I believe that it should, that the fifty states should be merged into
not more than ten to twelve regions.
There is a myth abroad in the land: that there is such a thing as the "doc-
trine" of separation of powers. The term, doctrine, connotes a carefully worked
THE AUTHORITARIAN STATE (1957).
154. Jay refused a second appointment, in 1800, as Chief Justice, citing health reasons but
more probably because he thought the Supreme Court lacked "the energy, weight, and dignity
which are essential to this affording due support to the national government." CONGRESSIONAL
QUARTERLY'S Gum TO THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 793, 794 (E. Witt ed. 1979).
155. See H. P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949).
156. This distinction is made in Miller, The Constitutional Law of the "Security State,"
10 STAN. L. REv. 620 (1958).
157. See M. DETRICK, BETWEEN STATE AND NATION (1974); REGIONAl. CONFLICT AND NATIONAL
POLICY (K. Price ed. 1982); Dixon, Constitutional Bases for Regionalism; Centralization; Interstate
Compacts; Federal Regional Taxation, 33 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 47 (1964). See also J. GARREAU,
THE NINE NATIONS OF NORTH AMERICA (1981) (suggesting regional governance for entire continent).
158. R. LEACH & R. SUGG, THE ADMINISTRATION OF INTERSTATE COMPACTS (1959).
159. A clear example, of course, is the way in which the Uniform Commercial Code was
speedily adopted by the states once it had been drafted. The large number of federal grant-in-aid
programs is another evidence of the point.
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out set of principles or rules that govern the relationships between the three
branches of the national government. Those relationships derive mainly from
custom rather than from rule or principle. It is only by an indefensible fiction
that specific decisions can be logically derived from the tripartite division of
power in government. The norm there is more cooperation than conflict; and
the very term, "separation of powers," is a misnomer. The system is really
one of separated institutions sharing powers. 6" The "doctrine" is not a doc-
trine at all but an unrealized and unrealizable political theory, known as such
to the framers. Madison, in The Federalist Nos. 37, 47, and 48, went to great
lengths to show that the branches actually shared power and Hamilton in No.
66 asserted that the separation maxim was "entirely compatible with a partial
intermixture"; such overlapping was both proper and necessary, in his view.
The branches are only seemingly independent. In America's Unwritten
Constitution, Dean Don Price invited attention to "the notorious 'iron triangle'
of government" (what Douglas Cater called "subgovernments" and Professor
Hugh Heclo labeled as "issue networks").'" This is the norm in much of
national policy-making: An iron triangle as has been noted, is made up of
the industry or group being "regulated," the relevant administrative agency,
and the appropriate congressional committee. Price admonishes us "to quit
talking about the constitutional separation of powers."' 6 2 And indeed we
should. Not even the judiciary is exempt from such a statement. Judicial
independence is one of the great myths of the American constitutional order.
Its principal function is to underpin the stability of the governmental system
and resist serious attempts to change it. '63 Judges are part of the governing
coalition of the nation. 6' Despite appearances to the contrary, federal judges
are seldom at odds with the other branches of government. "No regime is
likely to allow significant political power to be wielded by an isolated judicial
corps free of political restraints," Professor Martin Shapiro maintains.' 65 When
judges make law, as they do routinely, they are incorporated into the ruling
elite. "The myth of judicial independence is designed to mollify the loser"
in litigation, says Shapiro, who goes on to state: "One of the most important
aspects of the social control practiced by courts is that of wedding the populace
to the regime, of strengthening the people's perception of the regime's
legitimacy and their sense of loyalty to it. 1' 66 That is why it is true that one
is hard pressed to identify any Supreme Court decision upholding personal
freedoms when important societal matters were considered to be at issue. The
160. As classically pointed out in R. NEUSTADT, Presidential Power (1960), and as is shown
in D. PRICE, AMERICA'S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION (1983).
161. D. CATER, POWER IN WASHINGTON (1964); HECLO, supra note 130, at 100.
162. D. PRICE, supra note 160, at 135.
163. See J. GRIInTH, THE POLITICS OF THE JUDICIARY (1977).
164. See M. SI.PIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS c. 1 (1981).
165. Id. at 34.
166. Id. at 65.
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liberties of the Bill of Rights and the Civil War amendments are honored in
American constitutionalism when their exercise makes little or no difference.
If Price and Shapiro (and others) are correct, then the view, often
bruited,' 67 that the United States should move toward a parliamentary form
of government may be seen in a different perspective. Under Bagehot's "effi-
cient" Constitution, cooperation is already routine in the national govern-
ment. Only in the exceptional instance-as, for example, the War Powers
Resolution of 1973-is that routine disturbed. In large part, Congress has lost
the will to govern-as an institution, that is, but not as individual Members
participate in the iron triangles.
This conception of the idea of separated governmental powers presents
another problem for the structure of government in a new constitution.
Washington lawyer and presidential counsellor (to President Jimmy Carter)
Lloyd Cutler believes that the formal (Bagehot's "dignified") Constitution
should be altered in the direction of closer cooperation between President and
Congress.161 In some respects, Cutler advocates formalization and extension
of the patterns of cooperation that Dean Price describes, so that government
can pull as one and not against one another. Says Cutler:
A particular shortcoming [in the Constitution] in need of a remedy
is the structural inability of our government to propose, legislate and
administer a balanced program for governing .... The separation of
powers between the legislative and executive branches.., has become
a structure that almost guarantees stalemate today. As we wonder why
we are having such a difficult time making decisions we all know must
be made, and projecting our power and leadership, we should reflect
on whether this is one big reason.' 6 9
Cutler's diagnosis may be on target but his remedies miss the mark. What
he is really concerned about, but does not mention, are the manifest short-
comings of pluralism as a political order.
Since Arthur Bentley wrote in 1908, pluralism has been the prevailing
ideology of most students of politics. The group basis of politics got a major
intellectual jump in 1951 when David Truman published The Governmental
Process."0 Almost immediately, however, perceptive political scientists, such
as Henry Kariel,I 7' detected the decline of pluralism. A few years later, Grant
McConnell observed that much of government has "come under the influence
or control of narrowly based and largely autonomous elites."' 72 So, too, with
167. See, e.g., Cutler, To Form A Government, 59 FOREIGN AFF. 126 (1980).
168. Id.
169. Id. at 126-27.
170. D. TRumAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS (1951).
171. H. KARIEL, THE DECLINE OF AERICAN PLuRALisM (1961).
172. G. MCCONNELL, PRIVATE POWER AND AzmRicAN DEMocPAcY 339 (1966).
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Theodore Lowi and, more recently, with Robert Dahl.'" Pluralism is in dis-
array. It no longer "works" in the pragmatic sense.
I do not suggest at this time how the powers of government should be
allocated. The principal problem is not so much who exercises political power
as what decisions are made and policies promulgated. Constitutionalists will
have to come to grips with this problem at some time. When they do, they
will quickly learn that far more than Cutler's halting beginning is necessary.
Many other questions concerning the structure of government could be
discussed. Time and space permit only their mention at this time. They include
the following.
a. Implicit in the disarray of pluralism is the problem of how to get
true national or public interest decisions made in a polity that is dominated
by McConnell's narrowly based groups, the leaders of which are interested
only in the welfare of their groups and in neither that of other groups nor
of society at large.
b. Should Congress continue to be a bicameral body? Under present cir-
cumstances, Congress consists of 100 members in the Senate and 435 in the
House of Representatives. Even with large staffs, it is obvious that an individual
member cannot be privy to all of the some 400 public laws passed each session
of Congress. This argues for a better type of Congress.
c. Should the presidency be bifurcated? The United States is the only
nation of any consequence in the world today that places in one person the
duties of both chief of state and head of government. (That was one of the
reasons it proved so difficult to impeach Richard Nixon.) We do have an
"imperial" presidency; and the problem for constitutionalists is to devise a
means by which that office can be divided.'
74
d. The bureaucracy now operates as a headless fourth branch of govern-
ment. How can it be made accountable? The courts do not and indeed cannot
police the millions of decisions made administratively.
e. The dimension of private governments should be recognized. A cen-
tury ago the Supreme Court invented the "state action" doctrine'" and thus
insulated "private" enterprise from constitutional norms. That no longer will
do. Americans are governed as much, perhaps more, by purported private
groups as by public government. It is an anomalous constitutional situation,
crying out for change.
f. Some constitutional silences should be made explicit. Perhaps the main
one that requires specific attention is "reason of state." 17 6 The French con-
173. R. DAIm, DnEMMS OF PLuRALIST DEMOCRACY: AUTONOMY VS. CONTROL (1982); T. Low,
THE END OF LmERALiSM (1969). See L. TluRow, THE ZERO-SUM SOCIETY (1980); THE BIAS OF
PLURALISM (%V. Connolly ed. 1969).
174. See M. NOVAK, CHOOSING OUR KING (1974).
175. In the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). The evolution of the state action doctrine
is traced in W. LocHART, Y. KAMiSAR & J. CHOPER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES-COMMENTS-
QUESTIONS C. 12 (5th ed. 1980).
176. See C. FRIEDRICH, CONSTITUTIONAL REASON OF STATE: THE SURVIVAL OF THE CONsTrrU-
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stitution makes provision for such a doctrine, 1"7 but the Constitution of 1787
does not. That gap has been filled, for good or ill, by governmental actions,
some of which have gotten Supreme Court attention.'
78
All of these, and more, are structural problems of American constitu-
tionalism. They should be addressed, and soon, for all of them are important
to attainment of a constitution of human needs and thus a sustainable society.
2. The obligations of government. We now enter a relatively unexplored
field of constitutional theory. Most theory about political and legal obligation
speaks in terms of the obligation of individuals to the collectivity (variously
called society or the nation). "The great problem of political theory, especially
for a period of over two centuries after the Reformation, was to explain how
any man, born 'free and equal,' could be rightfully under the dominion of
any other man."'' 9 I wish now to reverse that and speak about the obligations
of the collectivity to individual persons. Not that the two conceptions are not
entwined; they are: A person may be obligated to obey the commands of a
particular government but is he similarly obligated to obey any type of govern-
ment? I shall argue that a constitution of human needs entails cognizance that
a person is obliged to obey government when certain "political goods" are
furnished by government, and take as a point of departure a statement by
Professor Nannerl Henry; drawing on Hobbes, Professor Henry says:
A person's intention, as a member of a polity, to enjoy the benefits
of that polity sufficiently obliges him to obey the authority that makes
those benefits possible. His obligation continues as long as the
sovereign is able to deliver the political goods, and no longer.
This argument in Hobbes is the most basic form of ... the argu-
ment to obligation from the performance of political tasks, or the
provision of certain essential goods and services. According to this
argument, government performs a set of functions that we necessarily
desire and need as human beings in society. Since obedience by sub-
jects is essential to the performance of these functions, we ought to
obey government. (emphasis added).'
That notion of obligation, of course, is directly contrary to that of John Locke,
who espoused a contractual theory of authority. Since Locke is the putative
father of the American Constitution, we thus move away from Lockean
notions. I have posited above that social life for individuals is necessary for
TIONAL ORDER (1957); Miller, Reason of State and the Emergent Constitution of Control, 64
MINN. L. REV. 585 (1980). See also C. RossrrER, CONSTITUTIONAL DrCTAToRSIP: CIsIs GovERN-
MENT IN MODERN DEMOCRACIES (1948).
177. See M. VoissET, L'ARTICLE 16 DE LA CONSTIUTON DU 40CTOBRE 1958 (1969) (for
comprehensive discussion of "reason of state" doctrine).
178. See Miller, supra note 176, and cases cited therein.
179. Pennock, Introduction to PoLrrICAL AND LEGAL OBLIGATION XM, xv (J. Pennock &
J. Chapman eds. 1970).
180. Henry, Political Obligation and Collective Goods, in POLITICAL AND LEGAL OBLIGA-
TIONS, supra note 179, at 263, 269.
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human beings and that means that some political order is essential. In sum,
my basic point is that obligation is a two-way street; and that humans are
entitled, in return for obedience, to satisfaction of their basic needs (so far
as the environment makes satisfaction possible). I deal, thus, with what
economists call "public" or "collective goods" and with what political scien-
tists call "political goods"-terms roughly synonymous with human needs.
"A common, collective, or public good," Professor Mancur Olson maintains,
"is . . . any good such that, if any person ... in a group consumes it, it
cannot feasibly be withheld from the others of that group." 18"' These common
or collective benefits are those routinely provided by government; they include
defense and police protection, the legal system generally, which are available
to everyone in the nation.
I am suggesting that the traditional view of public goods should be
expanded and constitutionalized. In so doing, I agree with Professor Chris-
tian Bay when he asserted that "the only acceptable justification of govern-
ment, which also determines the limits of its legitimate authority, is its task
of serving human needs-serving them better than would be done without
any government."'8 1- Says Professor Henry:
The major task or purpose or function of government, the reason
for its existence, is to provide goods of this kind, goods that are
collectively valuable, but which cannot or will not be provided without
common organization and coordinated direction of effort. Examples
of such collective goods are aids to economic production and exchange,
the establishment of courts of justice and the application of laws in
the settlement of disputes, the protection of certain rights claimed by
members of the polity, and contributions to the welfare of citizens
in matters such as health and education.18 3
I take this to mean that a government attains legitimacy-in the sense of the
right or title to rule-to the extent that efforts are made to reasonably satisfy
human needs. Professor Roland Pennock appears to agree: He has written
that political goods, defined as goods that "satisfy human needs whose fulfill-
ment makes the polity valuable to man, and gives it its justification,"' 84 are,
when satisfied, the basis for legitimacy.
How, then, are the needs of members of a polity to be determined? And
who is to say whether the level of political goods provided by government
satisfy those needs adequately? There are two basic ways of handling such
questions-the aristocratic answer and the democratic answer. According to
aristocratic theory, which may be traced to Plato's Republic, human needs
and the appropriate means for their satisfaction can best be determined by
181. M. OLSON, Tit LOGIC Or CoLLECTIvE ACTION c. 1 (1965).
182. Bay, supra note 99, at 241.
183. HENRY, supra note 180, at 275-76.




an enlightened elite. On the other hand, democratic theorists maintain that
no elite is sufficient to that task and the best means for answering the ques-
tions is to allow the people themselves to participate in making decisions. I
cannot take the time here to sort out the relative merits of the two theories.
There can be no question that it is a crucial problem for constitutionalists.
It can be said, furthermore, that whatever the formal or dignified aspects of
constitutionalism may have been, and still are, the living or efficient or operative
fundamental law has almost entirely been in the direction of aristocratic con-
trol. Robert Michels' "iron law of oligarchy""18 seems to apply to all groups,
large and small; that "law" has not been repealed. (It will of course be noted
that how and who decides human needs is also a question of the structure
of government.)
In what follows in this subsection, attention will be accorded to the follow-
ing: (a) the requirement that government satisfy or fulfill or solve certain basic
human problems of the day, including population size and growth, nuclear
war, environmental degradation, and poverty. Special attention will be paid
to the idea that the time has come to recognize that there should be a constitu-
tional right to a job. (b) The Principle of Reason-Directed Societal
Self-Interest,' 86 predicated on the belief that since people will almost invariably
act from self-interest, a major task of government is to create a milieu in
which self-interest has reason to be enlightened. Success here, I will argue,
is dependent upon whether we recognize, and act upon that recognition, that
our fate is closely bound up with the fate of the whole world and, further,
that there can be no enlightened (or even viable) self-interest that does not
perceive the requirement for living in harmony with nature (the total environ-
ment). These two problems will be briefly discussed in that order.
In many respects the first set of problems all involve the common element
of technology and its impact upon the social order. A recent comment by
David F. Noble opens the discussion:
There is a war on, but only one side is armed: this is the essence
of the technology question today. On the one side is private capital,
scientized and subsidized, mobile and global, and now heavily armed
with military-spawned command, control, and communication
technologies. Empowered by the second Industrial Revolution, capital
is moving decisively now to enlarge and consolidate the social
dominance it secured in the first ...
On the other side, those under assault hastily abandon the field
for lack of an agenda, an arsenal or an army. Their own comprehen-
sion and critical abilities confounded by the cultural barrage, they
take refuge in alternating strategies of appeasement and accommoda-
tion, denial and delusion, and reel in desperate disarray before this
185. See R. MICHELS, POLrnCAL PARTES (1911) (the "iron law" is this: who says organiza-
tion says oligarchy).
186. I have derived this principle from reading D. MILLER, SocIAL JUSTicE (1976) and first
applied it in A. MILLER, A "CAPAcrrY FOR OuTRAGE": TnE JUDICIAL ODYSSEY OF J. SKELLY
WIGHT (1984) (suggesting that Judge Wright's decisions can often be reconciled by such a principle).
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seemingly inexorable onslaught-which is known in polite circles as
"technological change. ' ' 87
I am suggesting here that a cardinal constitutional question of the day
is how (perhaps ij) technology can be so tamed so as to serve truly basic human
needs.
Technology, for example, produced the nuclear weaponry that now
threatens civilization itself with extinction. I have argued elsewhere that the
very existence of these unique weapons of mass destruction poses a crucial
constitutional question;'8 8 others have argued that such weapons should be
outlawed as contrary to international law.' 89 I shall not repeat what was said
in other places, but wish to emphasize that one of the human needs that govern-
ment, as the apparatus of the collectivity called society, has an obligation
toward Americans and others is to defuse that growing threat. (The obliga-
tion, of course, is one owed by any government possessing nuclear weapons.)
Technology, too, has been a major, perhaps the major, contributor to
the population explosion that has occurred and still is taking place throughout
the world (mainly, however, in the Third World). Death control measures are
one of the principal means. The requirement that this places upon govern-
ment is to take action to attain an "optimum" population throughout the
world, with that term being defined as one in which the population is of such
a size that the economic system can adequately provide for basic material needs
of all peoples. This, too, is a constitutional problem of the first order, as
John Maynard Keynes noted in 1920,'9 ° but it is a problem with which few
lawyers of any specialty and no law schools (to my knowledge) are concerned.
The numbers of humans grows steadily greater; the world is now approaching
the five billion mark, a figure that will exceed six billion by the year 2000.
That, of course, creates enormous strains on existing resources.
Environmental degradation, with some exceptions, continues at a rapid clip.
Here, again, a vital human need is not being met. It should be a principal
focus of attention in the writing of any new constitution.
Poverty, also, fits into this pattern. According to the World Bank, more
than 800 million people live on the edge of starvation, in "absolute poverty,"
today. There is little chance that they will be able, as individuals or as nations,
to climb out of the swamp of penury and want that is their lot. All of this
187. Noble, Present Tense Technology, 3 DEMOCRACY No. 2 at 8 (1983).
188. Miller, The Constitutional Challenge of Nuclear Weapons: A Note on the Obligation
to Ward off Extinction, 9 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 317 (1983); Miller, Nuclear Weapons and Con-
stitutional Law, 7 NovA L. J. 21 (1982).
189. See NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND LAW (A. Miller & M. Feinrider eds. 1984).
190. "The time has come when each country needs a considered national policy about what
size of population, whether larger or small than at present, or the same, is most expedient. And
having settled this policy, we must take steps to carry it into operation." J. KEas, TBE EcoNOnc
CONSEQUENCES OF THE PEACE 8 (1920). See Miller, Some Observations on the Political Economy
of Population Growth, 25 LAw & CONTEmp. PROB. 624 (1960).
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is well known and needs no restatement here. Rather, I should like to concen-
trate upon a particular provision that in my judgment should be part of a
constitution of human needs-the constitutional right to a job. The following
few paragraphs outline what I have in mind. 9 '
The United States has always been a labor-oriented society. People are
known more for what they do than what they are. This means that every aspect
of life must accommodate it, including education, leisure, and retirement.
Education in the United States is basically vocationally oriented (certainly it
is in the law schools). Vacations are leisure time designed to renew energies
so that people can return to work with renewed vigor. And retirement, in
many nations, is looked upon as a well-earned rest after years of work. With
the new technologies of what Noble calls the "second Industrial Revolution,"
the question has become that of whether work as such can any longer be the
center of one's life. In other words, is Dr. Ralf Dahrendorf correct when he
asserted that "There is no cure for today's unemployment"?'9 2 and was
Professor Richard Rubenstein correct when he maintained that "The threat
of permanent economic superfluity now confronts millions of American
workers"?' 93 The answers, I believe, are that Dahrendorf is correct insofar
as unemployment is traceable to population redundancy and insofar as the
present politico-economic system remains intact; and Rubenstein is correct in
pointing to the rise of a seemingly permanent underclass, of people superfluous
to the industrial system, in the United States. The damnation of worklessness,
of the terminal sense of the loss of work itself, seems to be the fate of millions
upon millions of men and women.
The question I am asking is whether recognition of a constitutional right
to a job could help rectify that parlous condition. Of necessity, I speak of
the United States alone, but with full cognizance of the fact that what is
beginning to happen in this country has already happened in many places of
the world. The idea of guaranteed jobs by no means is a new one. As long
ago as January 1944, in his annual message to Congress, President Franklin
D. Roosevelt spoke of a new Economic Bill of Rights, including the "right
to a useful and remunerative job in the industries or shops or farms or mines
of the Nation.""'9 In the early version of what was to become the Employ-
ment Act of 1946, it was stated that all Americans "able to work and seeking
work have the right to useful, remunerative, regular, and full-time
employment."' 95 The bill passed the Senate seventy-one to ten, but was
emasculated when it got to the House of Representatives. The final version
191. The discussion in these paragraphs draws upon Miller, Were the Luddites Necessarily
Wrong?: A Note on the Constitutionality of the "New Technology Bill of Rights," 8 NovA L.
J. 515 (1984).
192. Dahrendorf, The End of a Labor Society, WORLD PR.ss R v., Mar. 1983, at 28.
193. Rubenstein, The Elect and the Preterite, 59 SoUNDINGs 357, 359 (1976). See R. RUBEN-
STEN, THE AGE OF TRIAGE: FEAR AND HOPE IN AN OVERCROWDED WORLD (1983).
194. PUBLIc PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKL D. ROOSEVELT 41 (Vol. 1944-45) (Address
of Jan. 11, 1944).
195. See S. BAILEY, CONGRESS MAKES A LAw c. 7 (1950).
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of the bill did, however, acknowledge the obligation of government to take
action to maximize employment opportunities-in itself a significant milestone
in American constitutional development. 196
Others, including a Supreme Court Justice and some economists, have
echoed President Roosevelt. Justice William 0. Douglas asserted in a Court
conference in 1955: "There is a constitutional right in this country for a citizen
to have a job."' 197 Economists Samuel Bowles, David Gordon, and Thomas
Weisskopf maintain that serious attention should be accorded to employment
security, followed by action which would affirm "every worker's right to be
employed with decent wages at some job or another-but not necessarily always
at the same job."'' Similarly, economist Lester Thurow states: "[W]e need
to face the fact that our economy and our institutions will not provide jobs
for everyone who wants to work. They have never done so, and as currently
structured, they never will. When it comes to unemployment, we are consistently
the industrial economy with the worst record."' 99 Thurow then goes on to
say: "[The principal way to narrow income gaps between groups is to restruc-
ture the economy so that it will, in fact, provide jobs for everyone. ' 20 0 He
calls that a moral duty as well as an economic goal. I think, however, he
is talking about the Constitution and what it should provide to satisfy the
human need. Thurow does call for a "fundamental restructuring of the
economy."" '' The point need not be labored. Thoughtful people are beginning
a dialogue about the need for guaranteed work. My point was well put by
a retired policeman and former marine: "I don't think our system is all bad.
... What I object to is, there's no planning. I don't care how much money
it takes. They should put every guy that wants to work, to work.
' 20 2
Other human needs should be identified and satisfied. That is, or should
be, the core principle of any constitution. What those needs might be is itself
a question of complexity and difficulty. My point here is that it is a question
that must be answered soon. People are restive. They no longer are willing
to sit by without complaint as the rich get richer while the poor drop into
what appears to be a permanent underclass. 0 3 Whether that restiveness and
resentment will be translated into action is one of the critical questions of
the day. This brings up the second question of this subsection.
I have mentioned above the increasingly recognized fact that the system
of political pluralism is in disarray, and suggested that a Principle of Reason-
Directed Societal Self-Interest be developed. My reason for so concluding may
196. See E. RosTow, PLANNING FOR FREEDOM (1959) (discussion of Employment Act).
197. Quoted in B. SChwARTZ, SUPER CiEF: EARL WARREN AND His SUPREME CoutT-A
JurDiciAL BIOGRAPHY 184 (1983).
198. S. BowLs, D. GoRDoN & T. WEISSKOPF, BEYOND THE WASTE LAND: A DEMOCRATIC
ALTERNATE v TO EcoNoMc DECLINE 275 (1983).
199. L. THuRow, supra note 173, at 203.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 206.
202. Quoted in S. TERKEL, AmERIcAN DREAs LOST AND FOUND 232 (1981).
203. Compare K. AuLETTA, THE UNDERCLASS (1982) with Lodge & Glass, The Desperate
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be simply stated: a condition of social pathology exists in the nation-that
of factionalism..0 4 Let me explain. Professor Mancur Olson has suggested that
the fact of factionalism has direct and significant impacts upon the position
of industrialized nations, such as the United States and the United Kingdom,
in the global community.2"' Networks of collusive, cartelistic, and lobbying
organizations are formed. Their influence on public policy results in ineffi-
cient economies and a growing ungovernability in politics. Olson thus carries
James Madison's views, classically stated in The Federalist No. 10, a giant
step further. Nearly 200 years after Madison wrote, factionalism has become
a, perhaps the, most corrosive pathology of the internal American political
order.
Madison, sometimes called the "father" of the Constitution, in practical
effect was the philosopher of America's ruling class. He invented his argu-
ment against majority rule, set forth in Nos. 10 and 51 of The Federalist Papers,
for the benefit of those who were the main influences for a new constitution-
those Alexander Hamilton called, in the constitutional convention, the "rich
and well-born. ' 20 6 The Constitution was in fact a counterrevolutionary docu-
ment. What was at stake in the convention was the type of society that would
eventually emerge, and which class would control the levers of political power.
History gives an answer to that question: Society was to be dominated by
the propertied class; and the Founding Fathers were members of that class.
Those men got which they wanted, both in the convention and in a series
of judicial and congressional decisions in the early 19th century.207 They were
to have a free hand in exploiting the nation's riches. In a fit of generosity
Plight of the Underclass, HARv. Bus. REv., July-Aug. 1982, at 60. Lodge and Glass state:
Millions of Americans are looking for jobs, and other millions who could be employed
have given up the search. Our concern in this article is with a particular segment of
the poor and the unemployed: the 10 million people in desolate neighborhoods of our
major cities who are either more or less permanently poor or unemployed, those who
have been called the 'underclass.' Disproportionately black, Hispanic, and young-
although by no means exclusively so-the underclass is composed of single mothers,
high school dropouts, drug addicts, and street criminals. . . .They are alienated,
traumatized, angry, and hopeless.
204. Concern about factionalism can be traced at least to James Madison's Federalist No.
10. See G. Wras, ExP.LmcNG AMERICA: TnE FEDERALIST (1981) (discussion of factionalism in
The Federalist).
205. See M. OLSON, THE RIsE AND DECLINE OF NATIoNs (1982).
206. 1 RECoRDs OF nm FEDERAL CONVENnON (M. Farrand ed. 1927), quoted in M. PARENn,
DEMOCRACY FOR THE FEw 44 (3d ed. 1977). Said Hamilton:
All communities divide themselves into the few and the many. The first are the rich
and the well-born, the other the mass of the people. The voice of the people has been
said to be the voice of God; and however generally this maxim has been quoted and
believed, it is not true in fact. The people are turbulent and changing; they seldom
judge or determine right. Give therefore to the first class a distinct, permanent share
in government. They will check the unsteadiness of the second, and as they cannot
receive any advantage by a change, they therefore will ever maintain good government.
207. See A. KEILy & W. HARBIsON, TBE AMERIcAN CONsTUnTON: ITS ORIGINS AN Dvrnop-
MENT 157-283 (5th ed. 1976).
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without parallel, the "commons" (the resources of the untapped continent)20'
were turned over to a few. At the same time, government ensured that the
many would not do to the few what the few did to them.
Madison wished to erect in the Constitution "a protective ideology for
the minorities of wealth, status, and power" which was to operate as a blanket
over a political system "that would guarantee the liberties of certain minorities
whose advantages of status, power and wealth would, he thought, probably
not be tolerated indefinitely by a constitutionally untrammeled majority." 20 9
His plan was to splinter society (in Federalist No. 10) and to fractionate govern-
ment (in No. 51). In the last analysis, the former meant that those with wealth
and property would be societally most powerful; whereas the latter meant,
should a fractious minority (other than the rich and well-born) manage to
seize control of one of the branches of government, that minority would be
neatly checked by the others. That was a sort of "fail-safe" plan. With the
rise of other groups, coupled with the spread of the franchise, Madison's plan
has now become obsolete. Factionalism has become pathological.
Each group furthers its own interests by close alliances with the relevant
congressional committee and administrative agency. The larger interests of
statemanship are lost. No one, not even the President, is able to overcome
the fragmentation of policies and create a consistent program for furtherance
-Of the over-all common good. "The President's institutional system for defin-
ing a coherent policy is not established or protected by the Constitution." ' 0
Policymaking by collusion, within the iron triangles of the actual governing
structure in Washington, cannot effect either accountability or efficiency upon
government. Madison failed to foresee the shape of things to come.
A cure for the social pathology of factionalism can only come when there
is a recognition of and adherence to a concept of mutuality of interests, not
only among the diverse interest groups of the nation but among the peoples
of the world.211 How to achieve it is a problem for constitutionalists. I put
it in terms of the requirement for adherence to the Principle of Reason-Directed
Societal Self-Interest. By that I mean the following.
"Justice as respect for established rights, without regard to how those
rights are distributed among persons," David Miller observes, "is intelligible
208. See M. JOSEPHSON, THm ROBBER BARONS 52 (1934). See also R. LuSTG, CoRaRATE
LiBERALism: THE ORoumNs OF MODERN AmEiUCAN PoLmcAL THEORY, 1890-1920 passim but par-
ticularly at 95 (1982). R. RUBENSTEIN, THE AGE OF TRiAGE: FEAR AND HOPE IN AN OVERCROWDED
WoRLD 34-81 (1983) (on enclosure of the commons in Great Britain). The point is that the U.S.
government, dominated by Hamilton's rich and well-born, gave away the commons-the land
and natural resources of the nation-"to its friends or to astute first comers." M. JOSEPHSON,
supra, at 52. For a modern update of the question of the commons, see the famous article by
Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
209. R. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRAIC THEORY 30, 31 (1956). See J. BURNs, THE DEADLOCK
OF DEMOCRACY 21 (1963); E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, PARTY GOVERNMENT 9 (1942); G. WIL.s, supra
note 204, at xi-xxii.
210. D. PRIcE, AMERICA'S UNWRITTEN CONsTrrITUoN 127 (1983).
211. See Cassen, Mutual Interests, in THE BRANDT COM~SSION PAPERS: SELECTED
BACKGROUND PAPERS PREPARED FOR THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL DEVELOP-
MENT IssU s 1978-1979, at 395 (1981). See also R. FALK, supra note 119.
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when it is seen as the principle which restrains men from destructive greed." 2 '
It is intelligible, that is, when those who are favored by fortune have the sense
to perceive that it is in their interest to help the less favored. The Principle
is an invitation to those Americans (and others) who are highest in the social
pecking order to use their reason to perceive that their self-interest lies in
reasonably satisfying-within environmental constraints-the needs of those
who are less favored. This is not a new technique of governance. The New
Deal, for example, can be viewed as an effort to siphon off social discontent
among the "have-nots" of the nation by extending to them at least token
or cosmetic gains but without in any way restructuring society.2' 3 So, too,
with the so-called civil rights/civil liberties revolution of the Warren Court:
It also can be viewed as a means by which discontent among the disadvantaged
was diminished through gains in the formal law of the Constitution. "' I am
not, of course, saying that either the New Deal or the decisions of the Warren
Court came about by a preconceived plan to save the system through minimal
alterations in the status quo. But what I am saying is that when those
movements are viewed in their sociological perspective, it can readily be per-
ceived that there were both manifest and latent beneficiaries in each. If one
asks the necessary question, cui bono?,11' about each movement, then one
can discern that those who benefited by the New Deal were also those who
have always profited from the American constitutional order and that those
who also benefited from the civil rights decisions were those who would have
been greatly harmed if social discontent boiled over into social turmoil.
(Another factor is relevant here but can only be mentioned: both movements
came at a time of a greatly improved economy, at a time when the economic
pie was getting larger, with the consequence that many theretofore disad-
vantaged could profit from America's "golden age.") 16
The fundamental constitutional problem is to transmute what was done
perhaps by happenstance in the New Deal and the Warren Court decisions
to a means by which the divergent interests of the many groups in America
can be made to pull together. Here, again, we face an enormously difficult
problem, one that has plagued political and constitutional theorists throughout
known human history. I am, of course, not attempting an answer here. Rather,
it is enough to point out the problem and some of the factors that must be
taken into consideration by those who are concerned with it.
212. D. MILLER, SOCIAL JUSTICE 175 (1976):
213. See, e.g., Bernstein, The New Deal: The Conservative Achievements of Liberal Reform,
in TOWARDs A NEW PAST 264 (B. Bernstein ed. 196S).
214. See Miller, Social Justice and the Warren Court: A Preliminary Examination, 11
PEPPERDMNE L. REV. 473 (1984).
215. For discussion that the question, "Who benefits"?, must always be asked and explored
about governmental action, see A. MILER, TowARD INCREASED JUDICIAL ACTIVISM: THE PoLrCAL
ROLE OF THE SUPREM E COURT (1982).
216. America's golden age came, not in ancient times (such as the post-revolutionary period)
but in the 25 years immediately following World War II. See A. MILLER, DEMOCRATIC DICTATOR-
SlI c. 3 (1981).
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The major factors concerning the problem may be summarized or
telescoped into the conflict between the ideas of individualism and of what
Professor George Lodge calls "cummunitarianism." 21 7 Individualism, a relative
latecomer, is typical only of the societies that blossomed after the Great
Discoveries. The Constitution of 1787 was based on the view that only two
entities existed, the natural person and government, and the individual was
dominant. Society was considered to be atomistic. Individuals were tied
together, as Maine argued,2 1 by contract rather than, as in feudal days, by
status. The ultimate value was property, which was the way that individualism
was protected (we have noted Locke's view about the protection of property
being the purpose of government). Government was to be limited; it was a
"necessary evil." Implicit in individualism is the assumption that human nature
is fundamentally benevolent. There may be a will to power-to control events
and property-but underlying exercises of power is the theory, best stated by
Adam Smith, that through the operation of an "invisible hand" the common
good was best achieved by everyone pursuing his own selfish ends.
That general description of individualism is the basis for American law,
including the fundamental law of the Constitution. I have argued above that
individualism as an ideology is aberrational. Certainly it is at loggerheads with
the historical norm-prior to the Enlightenment-and to what increasingly
is the contemporaneous norm struggling to emerge from the political and social
confusion that a rampant individualism has produced. Yet, "because Americans
cling to the old ideology, much of institutional America lacks legitimacy, and
thus authority. So illegitimacy-and dubious authority-abounds.1
2 19
Communitarianism, on the other hand, looks upon the community
organically rather than atomistically. People attain their identity not as a
"sovereign self," but as a member of the community, which has drives and
interests of its own. There is an emerging concept of status perceivable in
constitutional law. 2 Equality of opportunity-the ideal of individualism-is
slowly being transmuted into equality of condition, although the process has
barely begun. Consensus within the collectivity is the goal, to be achieved less
by adversarial contractual arrangements than by all the parties coming together
in joint or mutual agreement. The individual person is expected, in the ideal
at least, to take the general good as well as his own good into account when
making decisions. In return for adherence to societal self-interest, individuals
are entitled to certain services from government, services that far transcend
those of the limited state espoused by Locke. Government is no longer a
necessary evil; rather, it is a full partner in community efforts. It is indispens-
able, because the concept of public or political goods is expanding and because
someone must arbitrate community needs.
217. See supra note 137 (works cited).
218. H. MAnE, ANCIENT LAW 165 (P. Smith ed. 1970) (first published in 1861).
219. G. LODGE, THE AmmucAN DISEASE 44 (1984).




The transition away from individualism to a form of communitarianism
is, of course, resisted. We live today with the remnants of an outmoded and
exploded ideology. But the change is coming, as Professor Lodge argues,
although in ways that many do not like. Lodge maintains that there are "three
characteristics of our unwanted transition-the creedal passion to stay with
the old, the inefficient and illegitimate transition to the new, and our confu-
sion about the bases of authority." These "begin to define the disease that
afflicts America. It is a disease about which little is known, and for which
there is as yet no remedy." ''2 (That is only half correct: Much in fact is known
about the "disease," that which we have called factionalism.) Lodge continues:
The American disease is a pathological condition, deriving from
a severe developmental crisis in the evolution of American society.
It is a psychotic condition, characterized by the denial of reality and
the inability to develop solutions to the problems being forced upon
the community by a new and unfamiliar environment. In its extreme
manifestations, the American disease has the symptoms of
schizophrenia, a condition for which there is essentially no cure; but
in fact, the disease more closely resembles the ailment of a troubled
adolescent whose grief at growing up causes him to deny reality, or
to cope with it through wishful thinking or a regression into immature,
counterproductive behavior.
The treatment of the American disease will necessarily include
a rebuilding of the foundation of our society. 2
The cure for the disease that Professor Lodge perceives poses the challenge
for constitutionalists: How can communitarian values be furthered while at
the same time retaining what is best in the idea of individualism? It is a challenge
that, to my knowledge, has neither been recognized nor dealt with by those
who write about constitutionalism. The basic requirement has already been
mentioned: the development of a social milieu in which the values of both
ideologies can be furthered.
3. The limitations on government. The Constitution has long been con-
sidered to be one of limitations or of rights (vested-property-rather than
civil). That it has become something more than that may be seen in a number
of recent Supreme Court decisions that impose a duty or obligation on govern-
ment to act. As written, the Bill of Rights and the Civil War amendments
speak in terms of negative limitations; nonetheless, at times they have been
construed affirmatively. I begin this discussion of the third function of any
constitution by illustrating how limitations have been turned into duties. That
is no semantic quiddity. I shall illustrate with cases from three areas of con-
stitutional law-race relations, legislative reapportionment, and administra-
tion of the criminal law.
223
221. G. LODGE, supra note 219, at 63.
222. Id. at 63-64.
223. These paragraphs are based upon my previous paper, Miller, Toward A Concept of
Constitutional Duty, 1968 Sup. CT. REv. 199.
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The point of departure for this development is Chief Justice Hughes'
opinion in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,2 " involving minimum wage legisla-
tion. There, Hughes stated that the liberty safeguarded by the Constitution
is "liberty in a social organization which requires the protection of law against
the evils which menace the health, safety, morals and welfare of the people.
Liberty under the Constitution is thus necessarily subject to the restraints of
due process, and regulation which is reasonable in relation to its subject and
is adopted in the interests of the community is due process. " (emphasis added).
The meaning should be clear: communitarianism was being read into the Con-
stitution by the Supreme Court. I have argued elsewhere 225 that in effect Hughes
(and successors) read Thomas Hill Green's ideas about positive freedom into
the Constitution. Positive freedom "reflected the rediscovery of the community
as a corporate body of which both institutions and individuals are a part,
so that the idea of collective well-being or the common good underlies any
claim to private right."2 6 Government, Green argued, had the duty not so
much of maximizing individual liberty in its negative sense but of taking action
to create conditions for a minimum of well-being-a standard of living, of
education, and of personal security.
It will not do to say that Hughes' (and Green's) conception of the "new
liberty" has been followed in toto. Consider, however, Brown v. Board of
Education227 and its progeny, particularly Green v. County School Board.2 8
In the latter decision, Justice William Brennan used language of "affirmative
duty" on school boards to integrate their schools. Consider, too, Baker v.
Carr22'9 and its aftermath, a series of decisions in which the Supreme Court
in effect ordered the reapportionment of state legislatures (and the House of
Representatives in Congress) on pain of having judges do it should the
legislators fall to comply. And finally, in such cases as Miranda v. Arizona
3
the Supreme Court "legislated" a little code of criminal procedure for police
officers to follow in making arrests.
These are representative examples. Others could be mentioned but, heeding
William of Occam, need not be to make the point-that the notion of con-
stitutional obligations on government to the populace by no means is a novel
idea. The question is whether it can be expanded, along Thomas Hill Green's
lines, to encompass a full spectrum of human needs. So much, therefore, for
the question of introducing the problem of limitations on government as a
constitutional function. The teaching of the cases mentioned immediately above
is two-fold. First, and perhaps of greater importance, a principle of American
224. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
225. Miller, An Affirmative Thrust to Due Process of Law?, 30 GEO. WAsH. L. REv. 399
(1962).
226. G. S.BInI, A HISTORY OF POLITIcAl. THEORY 674 (1937).
227. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
228. 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968).
229. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
230. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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constitutionalism exists that states, in essence, that government cannot fail
to do certain things. In Leon Duguit's formulation, governments "must do"
a variety of things for the people being governed. Second, and to state the
obvious, the Justices of the Supreme Court when making decisions and writing
opinions often do the logically impossible-a general rule is inferred from
one particular (the case being decided).
3 1
I turn now to what are considered to be the limitations on government-
the Bill of Rights, the Civil War amendments, and certain provisions of the
Document of 1787. Soon after the constitutional convention adjourned in
September 1787, Thomas Jefferson wrote to James Madison that a bill of
rights was "what the people are entitled to against every government on earth,
general or particular, and what no just government should refuse, or rest on
inference. 232 The framers, including Madison, simply did not believe that
a bill of rights was necessary. Alexander Hamilton had argued in Federalist
No. 84 that "the Constitution is itself, in every rational sense, a BILL OF
RIGHTS." But in the first Congress that convened in 1789, Madison introduced
the amendments that were to become the Bill of Rights. Speedily ratified, they
became part of the Constitution in 1791. The basic idea was to find a means
by which, in Madison's words, government could be obliged "to control
itself. ' 2 33 Reasons of state thus were supposed to give way to, or at least be
balanced against, reasons of freedom and human liberty.
In general, the Bill of Rights and the other limitations on government
are procedural rather than substantive. They assume that in a democratic society
"deliberation is about means and presupposes that the problem of ends has
been settled. '"2 34 The assumption does not hold water. In much constitutional
litigation, it is the "ends" rather than the "means" that are at issue. Pro-
fessor William A. Galston has made the point in these words:
In the last analysis . . .the quest for a purely institutional or pro-
cedural solution to the practical problem of obtaining justice is futile.
Every community, whether democratic or not, must rely on a rudimen-
tary sense of fairness and equity among its members. This sense is
not innate, but must rather be fostered through some system of educa-
tion. The traditional American penchant for political engineering or
institutional tinkering is thus profoundly one-sided; democratic pro-
cedures are almost vacuous in the absence of collectively held moral
convictions. (emphasis added).235
Galston's point is well taken. I readily concede, however, that he poses the
231. See Miller, Constitutional Decisions as De Facto Class Actions: A Comment on the
Implications of Cooper v. Aaron, 58 U. DET. J. URB. L. 573 (1981).
232. Quoted in H. AREDmr, ON REvoLuTioN 143 (paperback ed. 1963).
233. THE FEDERALisT No. 51 (J. Madison).
234. Y. SIMON, PtILosoPtY OF DEMocRATIc GOVERNMENT 123 (1951).
235. W. GALSTON, JUSTICE AND Tm HusiAN GOOD 279 (1980).
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single most important barrier to realization of a plea for significant constitu-
tional alteration-the fundamental need for "collectively held moral
convictions." -
Several points may be made about the Bill of Rights and other limitations
on government. First, they tend to be more hortatory admonitions to govern-
ment officers to behave decently in the circumstances than binding interdic-
tions against government activity. They are, in sum, not absolutes, although,
as in the first amendment, they may speak in absolute language. Second, they
have an evolving content. Their meanings have changed and continue to change
through time. As Justice Felix Frankfurter once wrote, "It is of the very nature
of a free society to advance in its standards of what it is deemed reasonable
and right. Representing as it does a living principle, due process is not con-
fined within a permanent catalogue of what may at a given time be deemed
the limits or the essentials of fundamental rights." 236 Or, as Chief Justice Earl
Warren opined in 1958, the eighth amendment, and inferentially the other
parts of the Bill of Rights, is to be construed in the light of the evolving stan-
dards of decency that are the hallmark of a civilized society. 23 7 Third, only
in recent years has the Supreme Court held that constitutional limitations are
applicable to state governments as well as the federal government. 238 Fourth,
the limitations are applicable to public government only, the Justices thus far
displaying an unwillingness to recognize the dimension of private
governments. 3 9 Finally, speaking generally, the civil rights and civil liberties
supposedly protected by constitutional limitations are not highly valued by
most Americans. Civil liberties are "fragile and susceptible to the political
climate of the time";242 and further, say Herbert McClosky and Alida Brill,
"We are not convinced that the craving for freedom is inborn, much less that
tolerance of others and the notion of reciprocity of rights are inclinations
natural to everyone. ' ' 21 We must, that is, face up to the fact of manifest
illiberality of most Americans.
4. The need for a procedure of periodic constitutional change. Since law,
including that of the constitution, tends to be far more a posteriori than a
priori, since, that is, it is a reflection of events rather than a molder, and
since the nation is characterized by extremely rapid social change, it is necessary
236. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949).
237. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
238. Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833), first held that the Bill of Rights (there the
fifth amendment) was not applicable to the states. It was not until 1925, in Gitlow v. New York,
268 U.S. 625 (1925), that the Supreme Court began a case-by-case repudiation of the Barron
principle. The process started slowly and came into fruition only during the years of the Warren
Court. See generally B. ScrwAxRgz, supra note 197 (discussion of decisions).
239. See, e.g., Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978). See also 130 U. PA. L.
Rav. 1289 (1982) (several articles on The Public/Private Distinction).
240. H. McCLOsKY & A. BRaL, DIMENSIONS OF ToiItA~c: WHAT AmFiacANs BuravE ABoUT
CivrL LBERTIES 437 (1983).




that some means be adopted whereby necessary periodic changes can be made
in the fundamental law. The framers in 1787 made formal constitutional altera-
tion extraordinarily difficult: the only express way is to follow the amend-
ment procedures set forth in Article V. Quite obviously, that has not been
sufficient to the need. Hence, the result of adaptation of the Constitution
of 1787 by judicial decisions, some congressional statutes, and some presiden-
tial actions. Constitutional interpretation is distinctly not a judicial monopoly.242
The question Americans face today is whether built-in constitutional
mechanisms that are immune to such adaptations should be altered; and if
so, how. I suggest that a pressing need exists for another constitutional con-
vention; and further, that any new constitution that is drafted should contain
within it specific provisions for progressive updating of the constitution as
social conditions change. I shall not argue the point, but merely state it, with,
of course, full cognizance of its controversial nature. It seems to me that if
Americans could draft a new constitution in 1787, at a time of relative tur-
moil, then they should be able to do so today. Those who fear another con-
vention display a depressing lack of confidence in the ability and bona fides
of Americans today to order their own affairs. (Even if they are correct in
their surmises, then we ought to know it rather than continuing on a path
of drift and reaction to "accident and force.")
The case against major constitutional change has been well stated by Pro-
,.ssor Dean Alfange:
I am unregenerate enough to remain unconvinced-not because
I don't see much of the same desperate need that you do for new
values and new ways of thought, but because I don't see how we can
discover those new values through reexamination of constitutional pro-
visions. The horse still comes before the cart. New values may guide
us to new constitutional principles, but without those values being
in place to begin with, the new Constitution will inevitably be an
embodiment of our current modes of thought. If we cannot trans-
cend the status quo through politics and legislation, we are not likely
to do so through constitution-making because the process will be guided
by the same political and legislative considerations that determine cur-
rent policy. Moreover, if we put the status quo in the Constitution,
where we can't change it, we won't be better off; we'll be worse off.2"3
242. For Congress, the following statutes may be mentioned: the Judiciary Act of 1789, the
Sherman anti-trust law, the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, the Employment Act of 1946,
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the National Security Act of 1947, The Budget and Impoundment
Control Act of 1974, and the War Powers Resolution of 1973. Each in effect dealt with the
structure of government and thus are constitutional in nature. As for the President, the prime
example is perhaps the de facto warmaking power of the Chief Executive. President Truman's
executive order establishing the National Security Agency is another example. Others include the
widespread use of executive agreements in lieu of treaties and the invocation of executive privilege.
Both, of course, have Supreme Court approval.
243. Letter from Dean Alfange to Arthur S. Miller (Apr. 26, 1984) (used with permission).
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That is eloquent. But is it accurate? I think Professor Alfange is correct only
in part: of course, the interaction of values and law (including the Constitu-
tion) must be considered. He, however, has merely stated the question rather
than answering it.
Alfange, of course, is correct about the importance of values, as was
Galston when he said that procedures to be adequate had to be based on
collectively held moral convictions. But that is only half an answer. Values
and politics must go together. James Ogilvy has said it well: "The argument
over whether social change follows from changes in consciousness or changes
in political structure obscures the fact that both must change if an alteration
in either is to survive." ' Values, in other words, are meaningless without
the political (read: constitutional) means to make them effective. In like man-
ner, mere political (again, read: constitutional) change in vacuo, in the absence
of a change in values, is ineffective. The question, thus, is not whether the
horse must come before the cart; rather, it is to see that the two-value change
and political change-must proceed along parallel lines.
At one time, perhaps, before the Reformation, the Church could be the
source of values. That changed, however, with the rise of the nation-state
to dominance. In The Political Illusion, Jacques Ellul explained the result:
"political disputes today are what disputes between Christians were in the six-
teenth century." Robert Nisbet agrees: "From about the sixteenth century
the national state became much the same kind of haven for man that the Church
had been from the time of the fall of Rome in the West.""24 Since people,
generally, require a faith, a belief that someone is in control, it should be
easy to perceive that values, such as they are, emanate from the state today
rather than any theological institution. The implication is important: there
is an educational function in law; changes in law can help create a new moral
climate. I do not say that law is omnicompetent but do say, with Judge J.
Skelly Wright, that it can be the "conscience of a sovereign people.
2 46
Morality in America, whether or not we like it, is largely a matter of rule-
following, with the rules being derived from the sovereign-the state. The late
Alexander Bickel called law "the value of values"; and said further: "we find
our visions of good or evil in the experience of the past, in our tradition,
in the secular religion of the American republic. 24 7 Although the law has
a "specious morality, ' 248 that is not the point I wish to derive from what
was said immediately above. Rather, it is that a "nation with the soul of a
church ' 2 9 can, through its official lawmaking organs, help set the moral
climate of the Unite,: States. Said another way, changes in laws-in the
244. J. OGnvY, MANY DIMENSIONAL MAN 7 (1977) (emphasis in original).
245. Id. at 39 (quoting Ellul and Nisbet).
246. Wright, The Role of the Courts in Expanding Freedom: The Conscience of a Sovereign
People, THE REPORTER, Sept. 26, 1963.
247. Quoted in LEviNsoN, infra note 248, at 37.
248. Levinson, The Specious Morality of the Law, HARPER'S MAGAZINE, May 1977, at 37.




Constitution-can help us discover "new values and new ways of thought."
I think that in some respects that is what the Supreme Court has been
doing in the past forty years, particularly during the tenure of Chief Justice
Earl Warren. Taken as a whole, the Warren Court decisions were an effort
to legislate principles of social justice for America.25 Not that the Justices
were and are wholly successful. To the contrary: in significant part the so-
called Warren Court "revolution" was less a revolution than a series of minimal
changes. But changes did come. The position of black Americans, as dreary
as it still is, surely is better today than before Brown v. Board of Education:
There has been improvement in the administration of the criminal laws. The
"rotten borough" system of malapportioned legislatures no longer exists. And
women now have more control over their bodies, their sovereign selves, since
Roe v. Wade.25" ' Judicial decisions may have erected standards toward which
all Americans could (and should) aspire; but judges did not act alone. Other
branches of government, federal and state, adhered in some degree to the newly
discovered standards. All of this, as is well known, was a type of constitu-
tional lawmaking, of finding new rights in the old Constitution and of enforc-
ing the Bill of Rights for the first time. Few today espouse a return to the
status quo ante, to, say, the situation of blacks before Brown. Is that, in
Alfange's terminology, a "new value"? I think it is. Which, then, was the
horse and which was the cart?
If I am correct in the description of the past four decades of constitu-
tional development, why should there be any great fear of a constitutional
convention? The essential concern appears to be that a convention would exceed
its assigned mission and propose amendments on a host of topics. "Single-
issue" zealots would, it is believed, control the convention. Those fears may
not be wholly groundless but they can be countered.
The counter-arguments should begin with the realization that, as matters
now stand, each generation writes its own constitution-not in a planned way,
to be sure, but through a series of ad hoc reactions to external stimuli and
exigencies. The net result is that the actual-the living or operative-constitution
today- is related to the Document drafted in 1787 only in symbolic or
metaphorical ways. Americans may and do revere the ancient parchment but
it has been altered so much, without amendment, since 1787 that the reverence
is not for a living instrument of governance but for the principal artifact of
America's civil religion of nationalism or Americanism.252 The Constitution
250. See Miller, Social Justice and the Warren Court: A Preliminary Examination, 11
PEPPERDmE L. REV. 473 (1984). See also G. WrTE, EAIR WPaREN: A PuBLic LWE (1982).
251. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
252. See Levinson, "The Constitution" in American Civil Religion, 1979 Sup. CT. REV.
123. See also Herberg, America's Civil Religion: What It Is and Whence It Comes, in AmsmuIcAN
Crvi RELiGION 76 (R. Richey & D. Jones eds. 1974).
The American Way of Life is the operative religion of the American people. This is
the civil religion of Americans. In it we have ... religion and national life so com-
pletely identified that it is impossible to distinguish one from the other. . . .It is an
organic structure of ideas, values, and beliefs that constitutes a faith common to
Americans as Americans, and is genuinely operative in their lives; a faith that markedly
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of 1787, furthermore, was based on faulty premises or assumptions. Newtonian
principles of balance-Isaac Newton had likened the universe to a great clock,
with interacting parts-were thought to be in control. We now know that a
new paradigm is required: the Constitution as it has evolved is based upon
Darwinian principles of process and even Einsteinian principles of relativity.
The Newtonian-Cartesian paradigm no longer is sufficient to the need. "We
are living in tomorrow's world today, still using yesterday's ideas." 2"
What dangers would a "runaway" convention pose? In answering that,
we should remember that the 1787 convention was itself a "runaway" meeting.
The delegates were there supposedly only to revise the Articles of Confedera-
tion; instead, they produced the Constitution. It took a lot of political
maneuvering, including the writing of The Federalist Papers, to get the new
fundamental law adopted. That leads to the second point: under Article V
of the Constitution, any amendments proposed by a convention must be sub-
mitted to the states and ratified by three-fourths (thirty-eight) of them before
they would become legally binding. That in itself is a major barrier. As the
abortive Equal Rights Amendment evidenced, opponents of an amendment
begin with a head start-they need only get one house of the legislatures of
thirteen states to block passage. By its very terms, furthermore, the present
Constitution prohibits denying any state equality in the United States Senate.
Of course it is possible that a convention would propose repeal of the
first amendment or any other provision of the Bill of Rights. But even if
McClosky and Brill are correct about the low status of civil rights and liber-
ties in the populace generally, it strains credulity that the nation would accept
such fundamental changes in its basic traditions. For that matter, as has been
noted, the judiciary could-it has on more than one occasion-read such per-
nicious views into the Constitution. 214 If the United States is in such a marasmic
state that the Bill of Rights could be repealed, let no one think that "parch-
ment barriers" in any constitution will prevent what determined majorities
want to do. Despite some evidence to the contrary, I do not believe that this
country is that far gone.
There are, moreover, benefits to be derived from the great national debate
certain to be generated by convening a new group of men and women to con-
sider the Constitution and whether and how it should be altered. That occurred
in Canada, according to Professor Edgar Z. Friedenburg, 2" when a new Cana-
dian constitution was being drafted. Americans in turn would be forced to
think hard and seriously about what type of nation they desire and how it
influences, and in influenced by, the professed religions of Americans. Sociologically,
anthropologically, it is the American religion, undergirding American national life and
overarching American society, despite all indubitable differences of ethnicity, religion,
section, culture, and class.
Id. at 77-78. (Emphasis in original).
253. H. CLEVELAND, THE MANAGEMENT OF SusTAiNABLE GROWTH 15 (1979).
254. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
255. Friedenburg, The Struggle for Human Rights, THE NATION, Mar. 20, 1982.
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should be governed. There are worse things. Indeed, surely it is valid to main-
tain that one of the responsibilities of citizenship is to confront such questions
and deal with them in thoughtful ways. Professor Sanford Levinson says it well:
The point is that the Constitution is not a menu of self-evidently
good things but a document and set of understandings that structures
our political lives for ill as well as good. If the thirty-eighth [sic] state
does endorse a convention, we should not recoil in fright but instead
make every effort to assure that state legislatures send thoughtful men
and women to it. . . .But we should not only take the prospect of
a convention seriously, we should welcome it, albeit with fear and
trembling. For it would give us the opportunity to define the country
we wish to be and to determine whether our current structure of
government allows us to be that country. If we do not ultimately trust
our fellow citizens to rise to such an occasion, then we should accept





Surely, Levinson is correct, Surely, too, there are millions of Americans who
would fight tenaciously and effectively for a new and better constitution. The
principal opposition to a constitution of human needs would not come from
the single-issue crazies; rather, it would come from those who have always
profited most from the American constitutional order-the moneyed and the
propertied-and who would resist change because they would perceive it as
jeopardizing their positions of social supremacy.
By no means do Americans have a perfect Constitution. We do not have
insight into revealed truth about how humans are to be best governed. There
is no quick fix, technological or political or legal, by which the increasingly
apparent social pathologies can be cured. As Americans, we must face up
to the harsh fact that our laws, including the Constitution, are always in flux.
Hence the need, to me both unavoidable and necessary, of another constitu-
tional convention, to be followed periodically by other conventions.
V. CONCLUSION
There is little to be said by way of conclusion. I have set forth some of
the factors that I believe should be considered in any evaluation of the Con-
stitution. Social change is certain to come-we are already well into the second
industrial revolution-and with it new and continuing pressures upon institu-
tions honored by time but little else, institutions that ever more obviously are
not up to the challenges of the late 20th and early 21st centuries. This essay
is an attempt to contribute to the growing debate about the nature of the
American political economy-about the constitutional order-a debate that
256. Levinson, Why Not Take Another Look at The Constitution?, Tim NATION, May 29,
1982, at 656, 657.
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seems certain to be conducted not only within this nation but elsewhere in
the ensuing years. The suggestions I have made are more in the way of ques-
tions that must be asked and analyzed than definitive answers to extraordinarily
complex problems.
Several questions have been left dangling in the foregoing discussion-
deliberately so. I have attempted in this preliminary probe into the need for
constitutional change to sketch the perimeter of the question. A fuller exposi-
tion must await another time and another place. For example, the concept
of human needs-what they are and how they might be satisfied-requires
further explanation, in connection with the horse and cart (values and law)
problem posed by Professor Alfange. So, too, with the manifest need to bring
the "private" governing power of corporate social groups within the ambit
of the Constitution. Of equal importance is the idea of the obligations of the
collectivity called society, speaking through its apparatus, government, to the
individuals within society; this must be thoroughly analyzed.
I do not, of course, expect ready or anything more than partial agreement
with what I have said. The principal point is that humankind has indeed come
to a great turning point in the history of Homo sapiens, and it is the task
of constitutionalists to grapple with that fact.
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